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THE 

RUSSIAN   COLLAPSE 

A  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  ESSAY 


By 
BORIS  KADOMTZEFF 

Bachelor  of  Economic  Sciences,  Petrograd  Polytechnicum. 


New  York 

RUSSIAN  MERCANTILE  AND  INDUSTRIAL 
CORPORATION 

1919 


RUSSIAN  MERCANTILE  AND 

INDUSTRIAL  CORPORATION 

50  EAST  42nd  STREET 

NEW  YORK 


THE   RUSSIAN   COLLAPSE 

A  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  ESSAY. 

By 
BORIS  KADOMTZEFF, 

Bachelor  of  Economic  Sciences,  Petrograd  Polytechnicum. 


LHVKTION 
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vjAl  TO  BE 
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PREFACE 

THE  principal  part  of  this  essay  was  written  in  May, 
1918,  and  was  circulated  among  the  author's  intimate 
friends  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum.  Since  that 
time  many  great  historic  events  have  occurred,  but 
these  have  not  caused  the  author  to  change  the  ideas 
which  are  set  forth  in  this  essay,  but  rather  have 
made  him  believe  in  them  the  more. 

The  author  is  glad  to  see  that  at  last  the  leading 
statesmen  of  the  world,  like  President  Wilson,  begin 
to  realise  that  "hunger  does  not  breed  reform;  it 
breeds  madness  and  all  the  ugly  distempers  that  make 
an  ordered  life  impossible."  These  words  of  President 
Wilson  may  be  taken  to  express  the  guiding  idea  of 
this  essay. 

The  author  would  like  to  express  here  his  thanks 
and  indebtedness  to  Mr.  CLIFTON  MOORE  for  his  kind 
assistance  in  translating  this  essay  into  the  English 
language. 

LONGFORGAN, 
WIMBLEDON. 

15th  November,  1918. 


THE 

Russian    Collapse 

A  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  ESSAY 

By 
BORIS  KADOMTZEFF, 

BACHELOR  OP  ECONOMIC  SCIENCES,  PETROGRAD   POLYTECHNICUM. 


ME.  GLADSTONE,  in  one  of  his  parliamentary  speeches, 
observed  that  more  nonsense  had  been  uttered  about 
the  nature  of  Money  than  even  about  Love, — and  we 
Russians  might  well  express  much  the  same  senti- 
ments respecting  what  has  been 'said  of  the  course  of 
Russian  affairs  during  the  last  four  or  five  years ;  but 
especially  of  that  period  which  opened  with  the  Revo- 
lution in  March,  1917,  and  has  continued  into  a  dark 
and  cruel  anarchy.  .  .  . 

Seldom  has  the  history  of  mankind  witnessed  an 
abundance  of  stupid  stories,  of  vulgar  generalities  and 
of  distorted  descriptions  equal  to  that  which  has  sub- 
merged the  name  and  fame  of  our  country.  News- 
paper correspondents,  journalists,  publicists,  states- 
men, even  scholars — all  have  tried  to  describe  the 
events  in  Russia  as  should  best  be  suited  to  their 
respective  personal  partialities:  sympathies  and  anti- 
pathies have  played  and  interplayed  ceaselessly. 


The  events  in  Russia  have  had  a  critical  effect  on 
the  progress  of  the  war  in  the  West ;  but  the  explana- 
tions of  those  events  that  are  commonly  proffered  are 
usually  framed  with  a  view  to  propaganda.  In  the 
circumstances  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  diag- 
nosis of  Russia's  malady  should  attain  a  high  degree 
of  scientific  detachment. 

It  is  far  from  my  purpose  to  accuse  politicians  or 
publicists  of  intentional  misrepresentation.  This  war 
has  assumed  an  extent  which  could  not  have  been  fore- 
seen by  any  military,  political  or  economic  student, 
but  only,  possibly,  by  writers  of  the  imaginative 
temper  of  Jules  Verne  or  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells.  In  a  word, 
the  actual  could  only  have  been  matched  by  the  fan- 
tastical. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  in  all  countries 
public  opinion  was  unequal  to  the  task  of  forming  a 
just  estimate  of  the  proportions  that  the  European 
War — almost  universally  expected — would  assume; 
not  surprising — when  it  is  remembered  that  even  the 
most  penetrating  intellects  of  Europe  not  only  failed 
of  a  just  prevision,  not  only  failed  to  sound  a  warning 
and  to  direct,  but  even  mis-directed  the  current  of 
public  thought. 

Everyone  knows  how  dearly  Russia  had  to  pay  for 
her  unpreparedness.  The  majority  of  our  military 
authorities — I  mean  Russia's — as  well  as  those  of 
Italy,  France,  England,  Germany  and  Austria,  reck- 
oned on  a  war  which,  though  cruel,  should  be  short. 
So  far  as  the  belligerent  nations  were  preparing  for 
war,  their  preparations  were  made  with  a  view  to  a 
war  of  short  duration.  A  lack  of  guns  and  ammuni- 

8 


tion,  though  greatest  in  the  case  of  Russia,  was  not 
confined  to  her  alone :  the  same  unforeseen  dispropor- 
tion between  means  and  end  hindered  the  advance  of 
the  German  Armies  on  Paris  and  robbed  i  Marshal 
Joffre  of  the  full  fruits  of  his  victory  of  the  Marne. 

While,  then,  European  military  authorities  so  much 
mistook  and  underestimated  the  requirements  of  the 
Coming  War,  the  politicians  and  social  experts  failed 
also  in  their  special  business  of  anticipating  and  an- 
nouncing the  political  and  economic  results  that  would 
follow  from  a  World  War.  ...  I  shall  not  restate 
here  all  the  predictions  and  pronouncements  that 
were  made  by  politicians  and  experts  in  Russia  as  in 
other  countries.  Let  me  mention  only  the  name  of 
Peter  Struve,  a  shrewd  and  penetrating  critic,  and  the 
acknowledged  leader  of  Russian  economic  thought. 
Here  is  what  Prof.  Struve  said,  in  1912,  regarding  so 
critical  a  matter  as  Food-Supply: — 

"Speaking  generally,  it  is  at  present  unthinkable 
that  in  any  coming  war  a  Great  Power  should  be  so 
hard  hit  in  the  sphere  of  food-supply  as  materially  to  be 
affected  in  its  chances  in  the  field."  (Great  Russia, 
v.  II.,  p.  146.) 

Again  he  says: — 

"Well-informed  and  prudent  economists,  judging 
from  experience  and  general  considerations,  are  not 
inclined  to  attribute  an  exceptional  and  peculiar 
importance  to  the  economic  disturbance  evoked  by 
war:  certain  dilettanti  of  pacifism,  however,  such  as 
the  late  Russo-Polish  Jew  banker,  John  Blioh,  create 
pictures  that  are  purely  fantastic  of  the  horrible  eco- 
nomic disasters  that  must,  inevitably,  flow  from  war." 
(Ibid.,  p.  145.) 


The  general  feeling  that  the  World  War  must  neces- 
sarily be  decided  by  a  few  lightning  strokes,  and  that 
therefore  length  of  duration  was  to  be  ruled  out  as  a 
determining  factor  led  to  a  very  remarkable  and  fate- 
ful consequence — namely,  that  the  responsible  states- 
men of  the  various  countries  directed  their  attention 
not  so  much  to  social  and  economic  aspects  as  to  the 
military  one.  AND  THEIR  PREPERATIONS  WERE  MADE 
ACCORDINGLY.  Military  and  naval  authorities  in  the 
countries  concerned  aimed  at  a  precipitate  mobilisa- 
tion of  their  armed  forces  to  the  end  of  inflicting  a 
sudden  and  mortal  blow.  It  was  not  their  aim  to 
mobilise  the  total  military  and  economic  resources  for 
a  long  and  wasteful  war.  Experience  has  brought 
the  nations  of  the  world  to  another  understanding. 


The  Character  of  the  World  War. 


The  history  of  the  present  war  may  be  divided  into 
two  very  distinct  periods.  The  first  of  these  term- 
inated with  the  victory  of  the  Marne  and  the  Russian 
reverse  in  Eastern  Prussia.  This  period  exhibited  all 
the  main  features  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war;  for 
both  sides  were  expecting  a  rapid  military  decision, 
and  therefore  needed  to  pay  but  little  regard  to  the 
consumption  of  men  and  material  involved  in  the 
military  operations.  But,  for  many  reasons,  into  the 
nature  of  which  it  is  not  possible  to  enter  here,  the 
combatants  in  this  later  war  were  unable  to  achieve 
a  decisive  victory.  Consequently  a  new  phase  of  the 
war  had  perforce  to  be  faced.  The  war  became  a  test 

10 


of  endurance  and  of  the  power  of  sustained  resistance. 
Other  factors,  besides  the  naval  and  military,  were 
brought  into  play:  the  economic,  political  and  social 
forces  of  the  respective  belligerent  countries  were  now 
engaged. 

In  the  first  phase  military  force  alone  could  have 
snatched  a  victory;  in  the  second  a  total  reorganiza- 
tion of  military,  naval  and  economic  forces  became 
necessary:  it  became  necessary  also  completely  to 
revise  internal  national  policy.  If  the  first  phase  of 
the  war  may  be  said  to  have  beeji  dominated  by  con- 
ceptions bred  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1871,  the 
second  phase  was  similarly  influenced  by  the  very 
different  conceptions  flowing  from  the  American  Civil 
War  and  wars  more  remote — say  the  Seven  Years' 
War  and  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

It  is  much  to  be  deplored  that  Russia  and  the  Allies 
failed  to  grasp  the  changed  character  of  the  war  imme- 
diately. It  is  true  that  certain  military  and  other 
experts  did  perceive  the  new  principles  that  were 
coming  into  play,  but  it  took  a  long  time  and  it  cost 
millions  of  lives  to  bring  about  the  realisation  of  these 
principles  in  practice.  And  it  must  be  admitted,  too, 
that  it  was  our  opponents — chiefly  Germany — who 
first  grasped  the  main  points  in  the  new  game,  and 
who  first  took  the  needful  measures.  Indeed,  it  is 
probably  owing  to  this  more  rapid  assimilation  of  ideas 
on  the  part  of  Germany  that  she  succeeded  in  holding 
out  so  long  and  had  even  some  warrant  for  her  hopes 
of  ultimate  victory.  The  obstinate  misapprehension 
of  Russia  and  the  Allies  of  some  of  the  most  essential 
factors  in  the  World  War  as  it  proved  to  be — and  not 

11 


as  it  was  conceived  to  be — brought  in  the  catastrophe 
in  the  Balkans,  the  disasters  in  Galicia  and  the  final 
collapse  of  Russia. 

The  Economy  of  the  World  War. 

The  initial  failure,  of  which  I  have  spoken,  of  either 
of  the  belligerents  to  achieve  a  decision  in  1914  at 
once  compelled  them  to  increase  their  armed  forces 
to  the  utmost  limit.  But  in  order  to  do  this  the  bellig- 
erent countries  were  obliged  to  sacrifice,  not  only 
present  economic  interests  and  the  immediate  material 
welfare  of  the  nation,  but  even  to  risk  the  very  founda- 
tions of  the  whole  industrial  and  social  structure  of 
the  State.  Owing  to  the  completeness  of  the  military 
mobilisations  many  branches  of  industry  were  either 
considerably  reduced  or  closed  down  entirely.  Only 
those  industries  that  directly  or  indirectly  subserved 
the  purposes  of  war  were  spared  partial  or  complete 
extinction. 

"Not  only  have  enormous  numbers  of  men,  and 
latterly  of  women  also,  been  mobilised  for  military  and 
naval  purposes,  but  the  vast  majority  of  the  people 
are  now  working  directly  or  indirectly  on  public  ser- 
vice. If  they  are  not  in  the  Army,  the  Navy  or  Civil 
Service,  they  are  growing  food,  or  making  munitions, 
or  engaged  in  the  work  of  organising,  transporting  or 
distributing  the  national  supplies," — says  the  War 
Cabinet  Report,  1917  (p.  xv) . 

In  all  countries  the  war  has  produced  an  extensive 
and  deep  revolution  in  the  economic  sphere.  In  the 
first  year  of  the  war  the  influence  of  this  economic 

12 


revolution  was  small,  for  the  people  and  the  armies 
were  living  on  accumulated  stores  of  goods.  But  the 
longer  the  war  continued  the  more  clearly  it  began  to 
be  perceived — even  by  persons  unversed  in  economic 
matters — that  enormous  military  forces  and  the  civi- 
lian balance  of  the  population  could  not  be  supported 
on  a  basis  of  national  resources  only:  the  belligerent 
nations — highly  industrialised  England  even — came  to 
depend  more  and  more  on  the  world-market  for  their 
supplies  of  foodstuffs  and  other  commodities. 

In  short,  military  mobilisations  of  an  unprecedented 
extent,  and  the  mobilisation  of  industry  for  (i)  war 
purposes  and  (2)  to  supply  the  needs  of  a  civil  pop- 
ulation during  a  protracted  war  were  not  to  be 
achieved  on  a  basis  of  national  resources  only.  A 
World  War  and  a  World  in  Arms  demanded  a  World 
Economy. 

Quite  correctly,  Lieut.-General  Baron  von  Loringh- 
oven  remarks  in  his  book,  "Deductions  from  the  World 
War,"  that  "now,  as  always,  it  is  the  sword  which 
decides  in  war ;  it  is  victory  on  the  battlefield  that  gives 
a  decision;  but  its  effect  is  far  more  dependent  than 
it  used  to  be  on  world  economic  factors"  (p.  11.) 

The  same  writer  further  mentions  a  very  striking 
example  of  the  Economic  Factor's  effect  on  the  final 
decisive  issue  of  a  whole  campaign,  namely,  the  block- 
ade of  the  Southern  States  of  America  by  their  North- 
ern opponent.  The  Northern  States  succeeded  in 
cutting  the  communications  between  the  Southern 
States  and  the  Centres  of  their  food  supply,  with  the 
result  that,  notwithstanding  an  heroic  defence  con- 
ducted by  able  leaders,  the  Southern  States  were 
strangulated. 

13 


Another  German  authority  on  military  questions, 
Admiral  Baron  Curt  von  Maltzahn,  in  his  book,  "Naval 
Warfare,"  written  1905,  describes  the  effect  of  the 
blockade  on  the  Southern  States  in  the  following 
terms:  "One  must  perforce  admire  the  tough  persist- 
ence, the  address  and  the  valour  that  mocked  at  death 
with  which  the  Southerners,  from  the  first  always  the 
weaker  side,  maintained  the  struggle.  But  in  face  of 
the  blockade  all  their  efforts  were  bound  to  prove  abor- 
tive. For  as  with  an  iron  ring  the  whole  area  of  war 
was  being  ever  more  and  more  completely  encircled  in 
its  relentless  grip,  and  as  their  strength  to  withstand 
it  failed,  so  little  by  little  they  weakened  also  in  their 
determination  to  continue  the  war.  By  the  winter  of 
1862-63,  the  army  in  Richmond  was  already  reduced 
to  half  rations,  and  was  in  such  straits  for  clothes  that 
one  woolen  blanket  had  to  suffice  for  three  men.  It  will 
be  readily  understood  that  the  discipline  of  the  troops 
suffered  under  such  conditions,  but  the  effects  of  the 
blockade  were  not  alone  felt  here,  but  spread  over  the 
whole  country.  .  .  .  The  land  was  impoverished  and 
its  credit  was  exhausted,  and  the  Government  found  it 
impossible  to  obtain  the  means  for  persevering  with 
the  war.  The  progressive  depreciation  of  the  paper 
currency — by  the  end  of  1863  a  dollar  was  worth  only 
five  cents — was  accompanied  toy  an  ever-increasing 
rise  in  prices,  which  affected  even  those  foodstuffs 
which  were  produced  in  the  country  itself.  The  whole 
place,  indeed,  was  like  a  beleaguered  fortress  in  which 
the  temper  of  their  fellow  prisoners,  the  civil  popula- 
tion, was  not  without  its  effect  upon  the  resolution  of 
the  military  forces.  ...  In  Richmond  [in  the  autumn 
of  1863. — B.  K.]  a  ham  was  fetching  46s.,  a  pound  of 


coffee  17s.,  and  a  pound  of  tea  71s.  .  .  .  The  railroads, 
too,  began  to  cease  working  because  their  rolling  stock 
got  used  up  and  could  not  be  replaced"  (p.  99). 

I  will  add  one  more  quotation,  from  a  book  by  the 
famous  Admiral  Mahan,  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power 
upon  History"  (p.  44),  as  to  the  effect  of  the  blockade 
on  the  Southern  States  in  the  Civil  War :  "Dismay,  in- 
security, paralysis,  prevailed  in  regions  that  might, 
under  happier  auspices,  have  kept  a  nation  alive 
through  the  most  exhausting  war.  Never  did  sea 
power  play  a  greater  or  a  more  decisive  part.  .  .  ." 

As  it  has  been  said  before,  Germany  was  the  first 
to  apprehend  rapidly  the  full  significance  of  the  war's 
new  phase.  Germany  perceived  that  the  problem  was 
one  "of  conducting  a  war  governed  by  world-economic 
considerations"  ("Deductions  from  the  World  War," 
p.  14),  and  she  gradually  and  systematically  proceeded 
to  the  solution  of  that  problem.  Germany  realised 
that,  owing  to  the  withdrawal  of  labor  from  agricul- 
ture and  industry,  it  was  impossible  for  her  to  endure 
over  a  period  of  years  without  using  the  resources  of 
other  nations.  And  it  was  for  this  reason  that  a 
German  Army  moved  to  the  Balkans,  and,  after  crush- 
ing the  Serbian  resistance,  conquered  the  Peninsula 
and  established  direct  communication  with  Turkey. 
Let  me  again  quote  from  the  above-mentioned  book 
of  General  von  Loringhoven: — 

"The  main  object  of  the  Serbian  campaign  was  to 
establish  land  communications  with  Turkey,  whose 
obstinate  defence  of  the  Dardanelles  had  rendered  us 
signal  service,  since  it  barred  the  exit  from  and  entry 
to  the  harbours  of  the  Black  Sea"  ("Deductions  from 
the  World  War,"  p.  11). 

15 


From  this  quotation  one  may  see  how  well  the  Ger- 
man military  authorities  understood  the  importance, 
not  only  of  direct  communication  with  Turkey — the 
country  of  abundant  raw  materials — but  also  of  the 
closing  of  the  Black  Sea  ports.  At  a  time  when  the 
Dardanelles  Campaign  was  meeting — as  it  did,  indeed, 
from  its  very  inception — with  a  very  strong  opposition 
from  military  and  other  quarters  in  both  France  and 
England — being  regarded  by  some  as  an  adventure 
simply — Germany  was  sending  selected  troops  to  the 
Balkans  in  order  to  prevent  by  every  means  in  her 
power  the  opening  of  the  Straits  and  the  freeing  of 
Russia  from  the  hard  pressure  of  the  Austro-German 
blockade.  Influential  English  and  French  newspapers 
regarded  this  campaign  of  Germany's  in  the  Balkans 
as  indicative  simply  of  a  desire  to  stimulate  public 
feeling  with  tidings  of  new  victories.  It  is  quite  clear 
now,  however,  that  in  this  estimate  these  newspapers 
— and  the  body  of  opinion  which  they  reflected — were 
mistaken.  The  meaning  of  Germany's  activity  in  the 
Balkans  was  simply  this — she  was  preparing  for  the 
Second  Phase. 

Summing  up  the  principal  features  of  the  World 
War,  we  find  that  the  creation  of  enormous  armies, 
the  mobilisation  of  the  civil  population,  the  deflection 
of  industry  from  its  ordinary  channels,  together  with 
the  effects  of  enemy  invasions  and  devastations,  have 
as  it  were  automatically  struck  at  the  root  of  the  Na- 
tional Economy  of  the  belligerent  countries,  and  have 
brought  about  conditions  in  which  no  belligerent  nation 
could  fight  and  exist  without  the  importation  of  goods 
from  without. 


16 


Now  this  dependence  on  external  economic  assist- 
ance, to  be  operative,  presupposes  a  free  intercourse 
with  foreign  markets.  But  if  this  freedom  of  inter- 
course with  foreign  countries,  allied  or  neutral,  be 
restricted  or  prevented  altogether,  then  the  country 
so  cut  off  has  the  choice  only  of  two  alternatives :  she 
may  either  reduce  her  army  to  a  minimum  number  in 
order  to  feed  and  save  her  social  and  economic  life,  or 
she  may  reserve  a  military  power — necessarily  of 
considerable  dimensions — to  cope  with  that  social 
catastrophe  which  must  follow  upon  national  economic 
failure.  Russia  was  confronted  with  precisely  these 
alternatives  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war. 


The  Blockade  of  Russia. 

Great  Russia  has  been  vanquished  and  overthrown; 
but  not  on  the  field  of  battle,  nor  by  the  ordinary 
weapons  of  war;  she  has  been  brought  low  by  the 
merciless  and  murderous  paralysis  which  has  been 
slowly  killing  her  ever  since  war  was  declared.  True 
to  her  traditions  as  a  great  nation,  faithful  to  her 
valiant  Allies,  Russia  struggled  long  and  desperately. 
Mortally  stricken  herself,  she  yet  delivered  hard  blows 
to  the  enemy ;  but  her  final  defeat  was  only  a  question 
of  time,  for  she  was  a  victim  of  the  most  powerful 
weapon  the  war  has  produced — namely,  BLOCKADE. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  Russia  found 
herself  under  the  pressure  of  a  blockade  of  a  magni- 
tude such  as  even  the  enemy  has  not  experienced ;  for 
while  the  enemy  overseas  trade  was  stopped  in  Decem- 
ber, 1916  (see  War  Cabinet  Report),  Russian  foreign 

17 


communications  were  almost  entirely  cut  off  in  August, 
1914.  What  Russia  could  get  from  abroad  through 
the  Arctic  ports  and  Vladivostok  was  a  mere  nothing; 
neither  in  itself  nor  in  comparison  with  what  the 
enemy  was  able  to  import,  either  directly  or  through 
neutral  countries,  was  it  anything  but  pathetically 
meagre.  How  small  was  the  influx  of  goods  into 
Russia  may  be  judged  by  the  figures  of  the  arrivals 
of  ships  in  Russian  ports.  I  think  I  do  not  mistake 
if  I  say  that  during  the  first  three  years  of  war  the 
total  tonnage  of  ships  which  arrived  at  the  open  ports 
of  Russia  was  not  more  than  the  tonnage  which  now 
arrives  at  the  ports  of  the  United  Kingdom  during 
two  weeks  only! 

Moreover,  the  few  ships  which  did  arrive  brought 
goods  which,  if  not  of  a  purely  military  character,  were 
still  destined  for  national  defensive  purposes  only.  It 
is  certain  that  the  importation  of  military  material 
greatly  assisted  the  reconstruction  of  the  Russian 
Army  after  the  catastrophe  in  Galicia  in  1915,  and 
ministered  also  to  BrusilofFs  victories  in  1916;  but 
such  imports  were  not  of  a  nature  nor  an  extent  to 
avert  a  national  economic  collapse. 


The  Effect  of  th<?  Blockade. 

That  instrument  of  force  which  is  called  the  Block- 
ade has  a  powerful  influence  on  the  life  of  a  nation 
even  in  peace  time.  History  can  show  some  examples 
of  what  effects  the  Blockade  can  produce — in  times 
of  peace— in  Greece,  in  Turkey,  and  other  States.  Such 
a  blockade  has  always  been  a  real  weapon  in  the  hands 

18 


of  international  diplomacy,  a  weapon  at  whose  threat 
have  trembled  alike  haughty  rulers  and  submissive 
subjects. 

But  in  war  time  the  Blockade  has  a  far  greater 
power  than  this.  Napoleon  understood  its  power. 
The  Northern  States  of  America  broke  and  crushed 
the  Southern  resistance  by  its  means.  In  many  wars 
of  the  past  the  Blockade  has  shown  itself  a  weapon  of 
supreme  potency. 

In  the  World  War  the  Blockade  has  had  a  special 
and  most  mighty  influence.  Even  the  dry  official 
Report  of  the  War  Cabinet  speaks  of  the  Blockade  in 
these  terms : — 

"One  of  the  most  important  weapons  in  the  hands 
of  the  Allies  is  that  of  the  blockade"  (p.  21). 

It  may  be  added  that  the  Blockade  was  one  of  the 
most  important  weapons  in  the  hands  of  Germany  also. 

Mr.  Asquith,  in  a  public  speech  ("The  Times,"  Aug. 
5th,  1918),  said:  "The  decisive  weapon  in  war  has 
often  been  found,  and  is  likely  to  be  found  again,  in 
economic  pressure.  When  countries  were  self-sup- 
porting this  was  made  effective  by  the  defeat  of  their 
armies,  the  ocupation  of  their  territory,  and  the 
consequent  paralysis  of  their  national  life.  To-day, 
under  the  new  conditions  of  the  modern  world,  the 
Allied  blockade  is  working  towards  the  same 
paralysis." 

Archibald  Hurd  ("Fortnightly  Review,"  Aug.  1918) 
describes  the  effect  of  the  Allied  blockade  on  the  enemy 
countries : — 

"We  can  trace  the  results  of  the  naval  blockade  in 
the  conditions  which  now  exist  in  the  enemy  countries. 
Austria  is  starving;  Germany  is  living  on  husks; 

19 


Turkey  is  reduced  to  the  direst  privations;  Bulgaria 
is  hard  put  to  it  to  keep  body  and  soul  together.  From 
the  North  Sea  and  Baltic  down  to  the  Adriatic  and  the 
Mediterranean,  starvation  stares  the  enemy  nations 
in  the  face.  .  .  ." 

I  shall  not  add  here  the  opinions  of  statesmen, 
political  students  and  publicists  in  Great  Britain, 
France,  Russia  and  in  Germany.  They  all  speak 
eloquently  enough  of  the  enormous  power  of  the 
Blockade  in  the  war. 

Blockade  has  the  same  paralysing  effect  on  the 
national  organism  in  whatever  country  it  seizes  upon ; 
and,  as  in  the  case  of  other  deadly  maladies,  its  whole 
power  does  not  develop  immediately.  The  first  symp- 
toms have  not  the  appearance  of  leading  to  a  great 
national  disaster;  people  regard  them  lightly,  and 
blame  the  "bad  government"  or  the  "greedy  specula- 
tors" for  the  lack  of  goods.  But  where  the  Blockade 
has  laid  its  paralysing  finger,  notwithstanding  the  most 
energetic  Government  measures  against  speculation, 
one  by  one  the  necessaries  of  life  vanish  from  the 
market;  prices  begin  to  rise;  the  family  budget  loses 
its  meaning,  proportions  and  stability;  existence 
becomes  insecure.  .  .  The  Blockade  crosses  all  front- 
iers, penetrating  into  the  house  of  every  citizen,  greet- 
ing every  citizen  at  his  morning  awakening,  shares  his 
meals  with  him  and  accompanies  him  darkly  as  he  goes 
about  his  business  or  his  pleasure;  it  speeds  him  to 
his  bed  and  companions  his  dreams. 

The  whole  life  of  the  people  becomes  infirm :  customs 
and  habits  must  be  changed  continually  in  an  attempt 
to  conform  to  the  novel  prices  of  goods.  The  masses 
begin  to  grumble ;  dissatisfaction,  like  a  fire  among  dry 

20 


grass,  spreads  quickly  over  the  whole  country;  and  as 
it  were  marking  singular  conflagrations,  hunger-riots 
and  violence  consume  and  destroy  the  bonds  of  civil 
order.  .  .  .  Government  steps  in,  we  will  suppose,  and 
rations  the  nation's  food;  but  to  meet  the  demands  of 
even  the  narrowest  rations  supplies  of  some  sort  must 
be  forthcoming  from  somewhere;  not  to  mention  that 
the  Governmental  Machine  itself  is  seamed  with  the 
common  discontent,  for  the  servants  of  a  bureaucracy 
will  suffer  from  high  prices  not  less  than  any  labor- 
socialist.  The  social  structure  cracks  from  top  to 
bottom — and  the  country  quests  eagerly  for  ministers 
to  mend  it.  Energetic  ministers  succeed  each  other 
with  the  rapidity  of  a  cinematograph  picture,  and  by 
the  very  fact  of  rapid  change  introduce  new  disorder, 
into  disorder.  .  .  . 

The  public  faith  in  government — as  government — 
so  much  a  matter  of  course  in  ordinary  times,  weakens 
and  goes,  and  is  supplanted  by  Revolution,  against 
whom  the  old  debilitated  authorities  are  well-nigh 
powerless.  And  be  it  observed,  revolution  bred  of 
Blockade  is  a  different  thing  from  the  more  familiar 
revolution  which  is  the  birth-throes  of  a  new  state- 
order:  it  is  rather  a  death-agony — the  death-agony  of 
Authority.  It  is  mortal  in  character,  not  natal;  it  is 
the  sign,  not  of  the  birth  of  a  new  order  or  a  new 
national  will  but  of  the  decease  of  these Block- 
ade crushes  the  old  order  very  effectually,  but  it  does 
not  create  a  new  one.  Blockade  smashes  to  pieces  the 
very  foundations  of  the  state;  political  excesses  and 
their  necessary  concomtitant,  brute  violence,  hasten  the 
dissolution  of  social  order.  Secondary  revolutions 
follow  closely  each  upon  the  heels  of  the  other,  drawn 

21 


on  and  urged  in  the  desperate  hope  of  somehow  shak- 
ing off  the  sullen  tentacles  of  the  Blockade ;  and  failing 
of  their  aim,  of  course,  but  exhausting  the  body  politic 
as  the  excesses  of  a  drunkard  in  his  efforts  to  elude 
despair,  exhaust  him  and  make  him  more  a  prisoner. 

Revolution  such  as  this  issues  in  anarchy,  dislocation 
of  economic  life  becomes  decomposition  of  the  social 
organism:  this  is  a  summary  representation  of  what 
befalls  a  country  that  has  the  misfortune  to  suffer  the 
pressure  of  Blockade.  It  is  the  tragic  history  of 
Russia  during  the  last  four  years. 

Every  Englishman  knows  from  his  childhood  the 
horrible  story  of  the  Black  Hole  of  Calcutta,  into  which 
the  Nawab  threw  one  hundred  and  forty-six  English 
prisoners.  These  were  driven  by  clubs  and  swords 
into  a  small  chamber  which  had  only  two  little  gratings 
to  let  in  fresh  air.  The  poor  prisoners  went  mad  with 
agony  and  despair.  They  fought  with  each  other  and 
struggled  desperately  for  places  at  the  gratings,  while 
their  guards  scoffed  'and  jeered  at  them,  mocking  their 
tortures  by  handling  in  scanty  supplies  of  water.  By 
degrees  the  tumult  died  down.  When  morning  came 
and  the  door  was  opened  twenty-three  only  were 
dragged  out  alive. 

Such  is  the  story  of  the  Black  Hole  of  Calcutta,  and 
such  is  the  story  of  Russia.  The  Blockade  was  as 
effectual  as  the  Black  Hole.  Whilst  her  people  died 
of  hunger  and  privation  her  gaolers — the  Germans 
and  their  slaves,  the  Bolsheviks — jeered  and  sneered 
at  the  agony  of  a  once  great  nation. 


22 


The  Economic  Disintegration  of  Russia. 
I.— From  August,  1914,  to  February,  1917. 

The  economic  disintegration  of  Russia,  under  the 
influence  of  Blockade  and  of  the  sudden  Stress  that  had 
drawn  all  Europe  taut,  began  from  the  very  first  day 
of  the  military  campaign. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  Economics  Russia  was  a 
German  colony.  Germany  was  the  chief  consumer 
of  Russia's  raw  materials  and  the  principal  importer 
of  manufactured  goods.  She  organised  and  supplied 
Russian  industry.  Russian  national  economy  was 
interlaced  with  German  industry  in  a  thousand  visible 
and  invisible  ways.  Not  only  had  Russia  adopted  the 
German  principles  of  industrial  organisation,  and  the 
German  Banking  System,  but  the  whole  industry  of 
Russia  was  actually  equipped  with  German  machinery, 
consumed  German  partly-manufactured  products,  and 
depended  for  its  efficiency  on  the  regular  supply  of 
spare  parts  of  machines  from  Germany.  Moreover, 
even  a  great  part  of  the  raw  materials  she  needed,  such 
as  cotton,  jute,  rubber,  hides,  wool,  etc.,  came  to  her 
through  Germany.  In  fact,  Germany's  relation  to 
Russia  may  be  expressed  by  saying  that  she  was  the 
Organiser  of  Russia's  industry ;  the  Source  of  her  raw 
and  partly-manufactured  supplies;  was  her  Banker 
and  Intermediary  in  foreign  trade. 

Such  being  the  Economic  situation,  the  closing  of 
the  Austro-German  frontier  and  of  all  other  foreign 
communications  was  bound  to  shake  the  Russian 

23 


economic  structure  to  its  very  foundations,  more 
especially  as  its  cause  and  accompaniment  was  war — 
and  European  war  at  that!  Even  in  peace  time  such 
an  interruption — or  rather  even  simply  an  interruption 
of  Russo-German  trade  relations — must  have  meant 
something  very  like  an  industrial  revolution,  or,  at 
any  rate,  the  throwing  out  of  gear  of  the  whole  econo- 
mic machine;  must  have  meant  a  situation  such  as 
would  have  demanded  tremendous  exertions  and  great 
skill  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  Government  and  Com- 
mercial Bodies  to  overcome  it.  A  great  readjustment 
requiring  much  time  and  a  stable  society  is  the  least 
consequence  that  could  be  anticipated.  But  in  the 
actual  case  there  was  neither  time,  nor  stability,  nor 
any  mitigation.  Everything  that  can  be  conceived 
to  aggravate  the  unfortunate  consequences  of  Russia's 
dependence  on  Germany  was  effectually  incident  and 
operative. 

Let  us  review  briefly  what  the  importation  of  for- 
eign goods  meant — and  means — to  Russia.  Before  the 
war  Russia  used  to  get  from  abroad  about  13,000,000 
tons  of  goods  and  materials  yearly.  Out  of  this  total 
9,000,000  tons  of  coal  and  coke,  250,000  tons  of  textile 
materials,  over  200,000  tons  of  metals,  over  300,000 
tons  of  machinery — and  more  besides — were  absorbed 
by  Industry,  Transport,  etc.  The  fundamental  industry 
of  Russia — agriculture — was  dependent  on  the  impor- 
tation from  foreign  countries  of  manure  (over  400,000 
tons),  of  machinery  and  implements,  of  packing 
materials  (bags  for  example)  and  other  necessaries. 
Every  family  in  Russia  needed,  from  imports  alone — 
yearly:  22  Ibs.  of  herrings  (herrings  and  potatoes  are 
the  staple  food  of  the  industrial  and  peasant  classes), 

| 

24 


4  Ibs.  of  rice,  5  Ibs.  of  tea,  1  Ib.  of  coffee,  3  Ibs.  of  lard 
or  oil,  etc. 

From  these  few  figures  one  can  see  that  the  sudden 
disappearance  of  foreign  imports  was  a  blow  felt  in 
every  town,  in  every  village,  in  every  family,  in  every 
industry,  in  every  "key-industry." 

But  the  disappearance — and  the  sudden  disappear- 
ance— of  imports  was  not  all.  From  the  very  beginn- 
ing many  millions  of  men  were  taken  out  from  their 
productive  work  and  placed  in  an  army  which  produced 
nothing  and  consumed  much.  The  military  reverses 
in  Galicia,  the  retreat  from  Poland  and  from  some  of 
the  Baltic  provinces,  were  not  only  grave  military  and 
political  events  but  also  economic  disasters,  producing 
a  kind  of  chaos.  ...  In  this  great  retreat  Russia  lost 
many  industrial  centres,  many  mining  centres,  suffered 
disorganization  of  the  whole  transport  system  and 
received  an  overwhelming  influx  of  millions  of  panic- 
stricken  refugees,  who  flooded  and  congested  Russian 
towns  and  swept  away  all  normal  standards  of  food- 
consumption. 

This  retreat  was  a  blow  of  such  force  as  to  make 
the  Russian  economic  system  tremble  to  its  base ;  nay — 
whilst  the  Russian  army  withdrew  from  the  retreat 
covered  with  undying  glories,  the  Russian  economic 
edifice  was  cracked  from  top  to  bottom. 

Following  on  the  retreat  as  its  chief  immediate 
effect  was  Russia's  necessity  to  mobilise  her  total 
human  and  economic  resources  for  national  defence. 
The  previous  mobilisation  had  already  deprived 

25 


Russian  industry  and  agriculture  of  its  best  workmen ; 
this  further  desperate  mobilisation  was  as  it  were 
a  mine  driven  beneath  the  foundations  of  a  fabric  now 
tottering  to  its  fall. 

Agriculture  was  the  first  to  suffer.  From  the  18 
millions  of  male  producers  engaged  in  the  agriculture 
of  the  47  governments  of  European  Russia  10  millions 
were  taken  into  the  army  ("Vestnik  Finansov," 
No.  31,  1917).  The  country  had  to  fall  back  on  all 
available  reserves  of  labour — but  these  reserves  were 
not  abundant;  not  nearly  so  abundant  as  in  other 
countries.  ...  In  peace  time  the  whole  Russian 
village  population,  old  and  young,  worked  in  the  fields, 
there  was  no  need,  when  war  came,  to  enlist  the 
women,  to  invent  more  convenient  modes  of  attire, 
to  recruit  battalions:  in  Russia  the  •  women  were 
already  enlisted,  equipped  and  serving  in  the  armies 
of  industry. 

Consequent  on  a  reduction  of  agricultural  workers 
followed  a  reduction  of  agricultural  produce.  The 
government  made  some  attempt  to  replace  the 
mobilised  workmen  by  prisoners  of  war,  soldiers 
specially  drafted  from  reserve  divisions,  refugees  and 
imported  coloured  labour ;  but  this  substitution  was  not 
a  great  success.  In  the  47  governments  of  European 
Russia  the  area  under  cultivation  for  cereals  was 
reduced  by  8  per  cent,  (in  1916  as  compared  with 
1914) .  In  Siberia  this  reduction  reached  over  20  per 
cent.,  and  in  some  provinces  of  the  Caucasus  even  30 
per  cent.  (Torgovo — Promishlenia  Gazeta,  No.  28, 
1917.)  Though  the  peasants  endeavoured  to  maintain 
the  same  area  under  cultivation  they  were  unable  to 
do  so,  moreover  were  unable  to  cultivate  as  produc- 

26 


lively  as  before,  because  (1)  they  had  not  enough 
labour,  (2)  they  lacked  agricultural  machinery  and 
implements,  (3)  they  were  deprived  of  many  artificial 
manures,  (4)  they  were  unable  to  maintain  a  due 
succession  of  crops.  The  result  was  that,  notwith- 
standing comparatively  good  climatic  conditions,  the 
crop  of  cereals  (in  European  Russia)  in  1916  was  400 
million  poods  short  of  the  average  for  the  years 
1909-18  (76.,  No.  1,  1917). 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  consumption  of  cereals  had 
greatly  increased.  The  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
Vodka  left  much  money  in  the  hands  of  the  peasants, 
who  could  therefore  now  afford  more  cereals  for  their 
own  home  consumption.  The  soldiers,  too,  were  better 
fed  than  they  were  accustomed  to  be;  and  finally,  the 
industrial  classes  of  the  towns  had  more  money  to 
spend  on  food. 

The  official  organ  of  the  Russian  Government,  "The 
Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  reviewed  the  critical  position 
of  Agriculture  in  the  following  terms: — 

"In  last  autumn  (1916)  there  was  not  enough  labour 
to  cultivate  the  already  reduced  area  of  winter  fields. 
The  mobilisations  made  since  then  have  still  further 
aggravated  the  situation.  Therefore  we  enter  upon  a 
new  food  campaign  with  rather  serious  indications  of 
a  more  acute  development  of  the  crisis  in  production. 
In  these  conditions  all  hopes  must  be  based  on  the 
spring.  If  in  the  spring  we  succeed  in  collecting 
enough  labour  for  the  short  time  of  sowing,  and  in 
sowing  those  fields  which  were  left  untouched  last 
autumn  we  shall  enter  upon  the  food  campaign  of 
1917-  18  under  more  or  less  favourable  conditions. 
Otherwise  the  shortage  in  the  cereal  harvest  iwill 

27 


increase  so  much  that  the  difficulty  of  the  food  ques- 
tion will  become  insurmountable.  In  the  spring, 
therefore,  the  fate  of  the  whole  food  campaign  for  next 
year,  or  perhaps  till  the  very  end  of  the  war,  will  be 
decided"  (No.  28,  1917). 

From  this  statement  we  can  see  how  anxious  the 
Russian  Government  was  about  the  serious  crisis  in 
agriculture.  Nor  did  the  Government  over-estimate 
its  seriousness;  the  situation  was  very  acute  not  only 
in  Petrograd,  but  also  in  many  other  large  towns. 

Rumors  were  current  that  the  town  populations 
could  not  get  cereals  because  the  peasants  refused  to 
deliver  their  stocks.  Official  statistics,  however,  show 
that  the  whole  stock  of  cereals  in  European  Russia 
was— up  to  the  end  of  1916 — only  16,700,000  tons,  as 
against  24,000,000  for  the  corresponding  period  of 
1915  ("The  Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  227,  1918). 
"The  Daily  Telegraph"  (Nov.  3rd,  1917)  gives  the 
following  picture  of  the  privations  of  the  Russian  pop- 
ulation before  the  Revolution :  "It  may  be  stated  posi- 
tively that  since  the  middle  of  1915  there  has  not  been 
a  day  on  which  queues  have  not  been  outside  the 
provision  shops  of  Petrograd  or  Moscow.  Not  one 
winter  morning,  even  though  the  thermometer  was 
below  zero,  on  which  women  and  children  have  not 
waited  in  the  streets  for  hours  to  get  a  loaf  of  bread, 
a  pint  of  milk,  or  a  pound  of  meat.  And  how  often 
have  these  weary  vigils  not  been  in  vain.  .  .  .  For  six 
or  eight  weeks  in  the  middle  of  last  year  it  was  im- 
possible to  buy  so  much  as  an  ounce  of  sugar  over  the 
counter  of  a  shop  in  Petrograd.  ...  In  the  villages 
the  food  question  was  not  so  acute,  but  there  were  other 
privations  which  were  felt  only  less  severely.  Nearly 

28 


all  the  implements,  tools  and  accesories  which  the 
peasant  needs  for  his  work  are  imported  articles,  and 
now  the  country  is  drained  dry  of  them." 

The  Russian  food  supplies  were  diminished  both 
directly  and  indirectly;  production  fell,  and  the  dis- 
organization (already  referred  to)  of  the  transport 
system  increased.  Moreover,  this  disorganization 
increased  in  an  increasing  ratio :  the  more  the  military 
needs  of  the  nation  demanded  of  the  railways,  the  less 
— as  time  went  on — were  the  railways  able  to  meet 
those  demands,  for  the  inexorable  increase  in  wear  and 
tear  could  not  be  met  by  the  repair  shops.  .  .  .  Stories 
of  corruption  among  the  railway  officials  circulated 
freely  from  mouth  to  mouth,  and  to  this  cause  an 
exasperated  public  sentiment  conveniently  assigned 
the  evils  of  transport  disorganization.  But  venality, 
though  by  no  means  absent,  was  far  from  adequate 
to  cause  a  national  disaster  of  such  magnitude  as  the 
breakdown  of  railway  transport. 

The  number  of  railway  cars  under  repair  at  the 
beginning  of  1916  was  20,130,  and  it  had  increased  to 
25,810  by  January,  1917.  The  number  of  locomotives 
under  repair  in  May,  1916,  reached  the  figure  of 
3,387  out  of  the  19,951  which  comprised  the  total 
equipment.  ("Vestnik  Finansov,  "  No.  27,  1918.) 

The  chief  cause  of  the  breakdown  was  a  lack  of  all 
sorts  of  materials  for  repair  work. 

Railway  transport  suffered  from  lack  of  fuel.  The 
situation  in  respect  of  the  supply  of  fuel  grew  very 
critical  towards  the  end  of  1916.  It  is  no  more  than 
the  simple  truth  that  Russia,  at  that  time,  was  face  to 
face  with  fuel-hunger  as  well  as  with  food-hunger. 

The  Government  created  a  special  public  body  to 

29 


consider  the  fuel  question :  here  is  the  opinion  of  that 
Commission : 

"Owing  to  the  suspension  of  the  import  of  foreign 
coal  (British  and  Silesian)  and  to  the  enemy  occupa- 
tion of  the  Dombrow  district  there  were  difficulties 
in  the  fuel  suppply  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
war.  But  in  the  first  year  of  war  the  crisis  was  alle- 
viated by  the  stocks  of  British  coal.  .  .  .  Down  to  the 
autumn  of  1915,  industry,  in  connection  with  its  mobil- 
isation for  war  purposes,  demanded  more  and  more 
fuel;  besides  which  there  was  a  great  increase  in  the 
demand  for  fuel  by  the  railways,  which  were  constantly 
developing  their  activity — to  the  point  of  feverish 
strain."  ("Vestnik  Finansov,"  No.  52,  1916.) 

The  Fuel  Commission  further  states  that  it  was 
obliged  to  make  extensive  requisitions  of  fuel  for  rail- 
ways under  a  pressure  no  less  than  that  of  saving  the 
situation. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  production  of  fuel  was 
decreasing  the  demand  (both  for  coal  and  naphtha 
oil)  greatly  increased. 

In  1914  the  Donez  district  produced:  in  the  first 
half-year  896  million  poods  of  coal,  and  in  the  second 
half  787  millions  only.  In  1915  the  total  production 
of  coal  in  Russia  was  short  by  60  million  poods  in  com- 
parison with  1914.  By  great  efforts  the  production 
of  coal  in  1916  was  increased  by  79  million  poods  as 
against  1915.  ("Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  14,  1917.) 

No  better  was  the  production  of  naphtha.  There 
was  no  decrease  in  the  actual  figures  of  production, 
but  many  firms  were  obliged  to  stop  work  on  new 
borings  on  account  of  the  lack  of  labour  and  of 
materials. 


30 


The  Government  came  to  the  assistance  of  the 
collieries,  and  assigned  to  them  a  certain  number  of 
prisoners,  besides  releasing  from  the  military  mobilisa- 
tion horses  and  materials.  The  Government  further 
improved  the  food  situation  in  the  coal  districts  in 
order  to  make  life  there  more  attractive.  But  all 
these  measures  could  not  avert  the  most  serious  sort 
of  crisis — a  fuel  crisis. 

I  shall  not  speak  in  detail — nor  do  I  need — of  the 
effect  of  a  shortage  of  fuel  on  industry.  It  is  enough 
to  say  that  even  workshops  with  military  "orders" 
were  obliged  either  to  limit  their  production  or  to  close 
down  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period.  Public  services, 
like  tramways,  electric  power  stations  and  so  forth  had 
their  operations  similarly  restricted. 

At  the  same  time  that  industry  was  thus  attacked 
in  its  basic  necessity — fuel — the  civil  population  stood 
in  great  need  of  manufactured  articles  of  daily  need — 
such  as  clothes,  boots,  &c.  Yet  the  woollen  industry 
— for  example — was  necessarily  working  entirely  to 
supply  army  requirements,  and  the  textile  industry 
was  only  allowed  to  allocate  25  per  cent,  of  the  pre-war 
output  to  the  needs  of  the  civil  population. 

Life  in  Russian  towns  was  exceedingly  hard.  Lack- 
ing warmth  in  their  houses,  the  people  also  lacked 
warm  clothing  and  sound  foot-gear.  They  suffered 
the  daily  torture  of  the  Food-Queue — the  Russian,  not 
the  British  variety — and  they  suffered  also  the  fear 
of  worse  to  come. 

These  are  not  conditions  to  raise  the  national  spirit 
and  inspire  patriotism.  These  are  conditions  to  sap 
the  national  spirit  of  any  country,  to  feed  discontent 
and  to  hasten  demoralisation. 


31 


Such  then  was  the  situation  in  Russia  in  the  Feb- 
ruary of  1917.  Discontent  was  daily  increasing,  and 
— since  it  seems  to  be  a  necessity  of  human  nature 
always  to  blame  something  or  somebody — blame  was 
freely  apportioned  to  the  share  of  the  Government. 
Few  understood — or  wanted  to  understand — that  no 
Government  in  the  world  could  support  an  enormous 
army — remember  that  the  Russian  Government  was 
forced,  in  the  lamentable  circumstances,  to  mobilise 
no  less  than  15  millions  of  men — and  a  vast  civil 
population  on  a  crippled  agriculture  and  industry 
chained  down  to  the  necessities  of  national  defence. 
In  such  a  case  the  presence  or  absence  of  imports 
makes  the  whole  fortunate  (or  tragic)  difference. 
.  .  .  But  the  people  were  not — and  perhaps  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  be — reasonable.  All  sorts  of 
charges  were  levelled  at  a  "bad,  corrupt  Government," 
and  "high  treason  against  the  nation"  was  a  favourite 
phrase. 

It  should  be  needless — but,  alas!  it  is  perhaps  not 
quite  needless — to  say  that  these  accusations — so  easy 
to  make,  so  impossible  to  refute — were  the  anguished 
cries  of  a  sick  people ;  a  people  tormented  by  a  malady 
whose  true  name  was  Blockade,  but  whose  current 
label  was  ''a  corrupt  and  incompetent  autocracy."  The 
Russian  people  blamed  the  Government:  is  there  a 
people  in  the  world  who  would  not  have  done  precisely 
the  same  in  the  same  circumstances?  The  unhappy 
Russian  nation  was  mistaken  as  a  sufferer  usually  is 
mistaken  when  he  attempts — naturally  enough — to 
diagnose  and  prescribe  for  his  own  symptoms.  .  .  . 
Nobody  would  absolve  the  Tzar's  Government  of  all 
the  blunders  laid  to  its  charge,  but  in  bare  justice  it 

32 


should  be  understood  and  conceded  that  the  Imperial 
Government  did  its  best  to  avert  disaster;  and  if  this 
Government  was  not  the  most  efficient  conceivable  it 
was  certainly  well-nigh  one  of  the  best  that  the  real 
Russia — not  the  Russia  of  legend — could  have  had. 

The  scandalous  and  exciting  stories  that  circle  round 
the  figure  of  the  monk  Rasputin  are  excellently  adapted 
to  the  purposes  they  subserve,  namely,  of  creating  a 
thrill  in  the  breasts  of  the  credulous,  and  of  providing 
a  ready-made  substitute  for  sober  judgment;  but  they 
should  not  be  taken  seriously  by  serious  people;  nor 
should  the  "crimes  of  the  old  regime"  be  taken  as  the 
real  explanation  of  the  Russian  collapse. 

By  February,  1917,  the  Russian  Government  was  on 
the  horns  of  a  dilemma:  either  they  might  conclude 
peace  with  Germany  and  betray  the  Allies,  or  they 
might  persevere  in  their  dual  war  against  the  Germans 
on  the  one  hand  and  a  ruined  national  economy  on  the 
other. 

It  may  quite  well  be  that  some  experienced  states- 
men advised  the  Tzar  to  save  his  country  from  the 
disaster  that  they  foresaw  by  secession  from  the  Allied 
cause:  but  if  that  was  so  the  Tzar  of  Russia  refused 
to  listen  to  these  dishonourable  advisers,  and  remained, 
to  the  last  minute  of  his  power,  faithful  to  the  Allies. 
But  his  martyr-death  alone  could  remove  him  from  the 
aim  of  the  vile  charges  which  were  made  against  him 
in  Russia  and  in  other  countries.  One  need  not  be  a 
monarchist  to  read  with  a  pain  at  the  heart  the  last 
words  which  the  Tzar  addressed  to  Russia : 

"In  the  days  of  a  great  struggle  against  an  external 
enemy  who  for  three  years  has  been  striving  to  enslave 
our  country,  it  has  pleased  the  Lord  God  to  send  down 

33 


on  Russia  new  and  severe  trials.  The  internal  tumults 
which  have  begun  threaten  to  have  a  fatal  effect  on  the 
further  progress  of  this  obstinate  war.  The  destiny 
of  Russia,  the  honour  of  our  heroic  army,  the  welfare 
,  of  the  people,  and  the  whole  future  of  our  dear  father- 
land demand  that  the  war  shall  be  conducted  at  all 
costs  to  a  victorious  end."  . 


The  Economic  Disintegration  of  Russia. 

II.  From  the  March  Revolution  to  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution. 

The  Bolsheviks  love  to  repeat  that  they,  are  the 
direct  successors  of  the  masters  of  the  Paris  Commune 
of  1871.  And  it  may  be  so ;  for  as  we  know  from  the 
history  of  France  the  Commune  was  established  in 
Paris  when  the  town  was  besieged  (or  blockaded)  by 
the  enemy. 

The  Russian  Revolution  of  March,  1917,  broke  out 
first  in  a  town  which,  though  not  literally  besieged, 
was  suffering  most  from  the  effects  of  Blockade;  it 
broke  out  in  Petrograd.  The  setting  up  of  the  Com- 
mune in  Paris  and  the  outbreak  of  revolution  in 
Petrograd  were  both  produced  by  the  same  force, 
namely,  the  power  of  Blockade. 

But  the  term  "Blockade"  as  applied  to  Petrograd 
requires  a  little  explanation.  The  external  blockade 
of  Russia,  together  with  the  internal  process  of 
economic  disintegration,  disorganised  the  system  of 
internal  communications  so  much  as  to  transform 
Russia  from  being  one  economic  whole  into  a  congeries 

34 


of  separate  provinces — separate  because  of  the  great 
difficulty  of  communication  between  one  and  another. 
Province  was  cut  off  from  province  as  much  as  though 
the  enemy  had  really  penetrated  deeply  into  Russia  and 
by  force  had  isolated  part  from  part.  And  Petrograd 
suffered  from  this  "internal  blockade"  most  of  all. 

The  railway  communications  between  Petrograd  and 
the  centres  of  food  and  fuel  supply  were  disorganised 
from  the  first  day  of  the  war,  and  right  on  to  February, 
1917,  the  greatly  reduced  railway  traffic  was  main- 
tained only  by  the  most  drastic  measures  of  the 
Government.  Consequently  it  was  in  Petrograd  the 
Revolution  broke  out  first.  It  began  like  any  ordinary 
hunger  riot:  the  shouting  people  in  the  streets 
demanded  bread,  not  any  new  political  liberties.  The 
Revolution  was  started,  not  by  fiery  demagogues,  but 
by  an  old  woman,  who,  with  trembling  hand,  smashed 
a  baker's  window. 

The  Revolution  which  the  whole  world  has  acclaimed 
in  a  hurry  as  the  liberation  of  Russia  from  the  fetters 
of  slavery  and  despotism  was  in  reality  a  sign  to  the 
whole  world  that  a  great  social  state  was  entering  upon 
its  death  agony.  The  Tzar  and  Tzarism  were  destroyed 
— and  so  also,  for  the  time  being,  was  a  great  nation. 
The  Revolution  was  a  sickness  unto  death,  not  the  flush 
of  returning  health. 

At  first  the  Revolution  awakened  a  great  enthusiasm 
in  the  masses  of  the  Russian  population ;  everyone  saw 
the  future  in  terms  of  rose-coloured  hopes.  But  the 
illusion  soon  faded,  .  .  .  The  normal  progress  of  the 
economic  life  of  any  country  can  be  twisted  awry 
by  political  conflict  and  unbridled  demagogic  activity 
alone.  The  whole  population  of  Russia  was  already 

35 


greatly  incensed  by  the  lack  of  commodities  of  prime 
necessity;  consequently  a  political  agitation  unscru- 
pulously directed  towards  the  creating  and  fostering 
of  suspicion  against  one  class  of  the  population  was 
bound  to  meet  with  an  overwhelming  success.  It  was 
whispered,  proclaimed,  believed  that  the  richer  classes 
were  consuming  their  own  and  others'  share  of  the 
common  stores. 

The  first  revolutionary  Government  was  torn 
between  anxiety  for  the  military  situation  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  civil  situation  on  the  other.  The  discip- 
line of  civil  life  was  failing,  and  with  it  the  discipline 
of  the  army.  The  country  could  have  been  saved  only 
by  introducing  the  most  severe  discipline  at  the  front 
and  also  at  home:  only  the  minimum  of  goods 
necessary  to  stave  off  cold  and  starvation  should  have 
been  doled  out.  The  revolutionary  Government  was 
able  to  do  neither  the  one  nor  the  other :  it  was  incap- 
able of  grasping  the  deadly  nature  of  the  effect  of  the 
Blockade  on  Russian  social  and  economic  life.  Milukoff 
and  Kerensky  failed  to  break  the  Blockade :  the  Block- 
ade broke  them. 

I  am  far  from  accusing  Mr.  Kerensky  and  [his 
friends  of  ruining  Russia.  Powerful  as  they  were, 
they  were  not  quite  so  powerful  as  that  would  imply. 
A  mighty  Empire  is  not  so  easily  brought  to  ruin. 
His  Revolutionary  Majesty,  Blockade,  was  Russia's, 
real  destroyer.  .  .  .  But  although  Mr.  Kerensky  and 
his  friends  did  not  destroy  Russia,  it  is  just  conceivable 
that  they  might  have  saved  her.  That  is  to  say,  a 
more  energetic,  a  more  severe,  I  will  venture  to  say  a 
more  Russian  Government  might  have  guided  the 
national  enthusiasm  to  better  purpose.  For  the 

36 


blunders  of  the  revolutionary  Government  were  such 
as  Russia  had  never  yet  in  all  her  history  experienced. 
.  .  .  But  even  the  best  possible  Government  in  the 
circumstances  could  not  have  saved  Russia  but  by 
breaking  the  Blockade  or  by  ending  the  war.  At  that 
time  there  was  no  hope  of  breaking  through  Turkey 
and  so  of  establishing  direct  communication  with  the 
Allies.  The  Kerensky  Government  tried  to  end  the 
war  with  one  mighty  blow  delivered  against  the 
enemy :  the  event  was  an  utter  and  shameful  failure. 

The  position  of  Russia  was  now  desperate:  the 
country  was  not  in  a  state  to  continue  even  a  defensive 
war  without  substantial  support  from  the  Allies.  I 
am  unable  to  explain  and  I  cannot  understand  how  the 
Allies  failed  to  hear  the  one  cry  that  rose  with  a 
dreadful  unanimity  from  every  town  and  village,  from 
the  throat  of  every  soldier,  that  broke  from  the 
famished  lips  of  every  Russian  mother — Save  us  from 
the  Blockade  or  we  shall  perish!  Instead  of  sending 
to  Russia  an  Economic  Commission  composed  of  the 
best  experts,  a  band  of  half -educated  labor  represen- 
tatives were  despatched.  .  .  . 

While  refusing  all  the  enemy  propositions  for  peace, 
the  Kerensky  Government  attempted  to  lighten  the 
burden  laid  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  population  by 
reducing  the  army  to  a  minimum.  It  was  a  palliative 
only,  and  like  all  palliatives  it  failed.  It  was  patheti- 
cally inadequate  to  the  needs  of  a  country  in  which 
social  and  economic  disintegration  was  making  more 
and  yet  more  rapid  progress. 

As  I  mentioned  before,  the  events  which  followed 
the  March  Revolution  precipated  the  economic  crisis. 
If  before  the  Revolution  there  was  a  dearth  of  food 


37 


and  material,  after  the  Revolution  all  the  signs 
appeared  of  an  approach  to  actual  starvation  (Torg. 
"Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  116,  1917). 

The  Revolution  struck  specially  hard  at  the  agricul- 
tural system  of  Russia.  The  pillage  of  agricultural 
properties,  the  feverish  sharing  among  the  peasants 
of  private  land,  and  other  revolutionary  excesses 
greatly  reduced  the  productivity  of  the  agricultural 
industry.  The  whole  position  of  agriculture  grew 
very  serious  indeed  towards  the  spring  of  1917,  and — 
as  was  said  in  the  above-quoted  official  report — only 
by  energetic  measures  could  a  crisis  have  been  averted. 

It  is  difficult  to  estimate  how  much  the  production 
of  cereals  was  reduced  by  the  influence  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. The  whole  area  of  cultivated  land  owned  by 
landlords  in  European  Russia  was  7.6  millions  of 
desiatin,  which  had  ordinarily  produced  about  500 
million  poods  of  cereals.  For  a  long  time  the  peasants 
were  unable  to  effect  a  division  of  this  land  among 
themselves;  and  even  if  they  had  been  able  to  arrive 
at  a  division  that  all  would  agree  to  at  once  they  would 
still  have  been  unable  to  effect  anything  like  its  former 
measure  of  cultivation.  Therefore,  if  not  the  whole 
of  this  500  million  poods  of  cereals  was  lost  to  Russia, 
certainly  by  far  the  larger  part  of  it  was,  to  which 
must  be  added  400  million  poods  lost  before  the  Revolu- 
tion. Moreover,  the  production  of  cereals  was  reduced 
owing  to  yet  other  causes.  For  the  old  regime  had 
allotted  to  agricultural  works  the  labour  of  soldiers 
and  prisoners.  After  the  Revolution  the  soldiers 
refused  obedience,  and  by  main  force  compelled  the 
prisoners  to  follow  their  example.  Further,  the  need 
for  machinery  and  implements  was  more  acute  than 

38 


ever.  It  was  ascertained  that  5  millions  of  scythes 
were  urgently  wanted :  the  home  industry  could  supply 
20,000  only.  The  harvest  in  some  provinces  perished 
in  the  fields.  The  need  for  agricultural  implements 
was  so  great  that  in  many  places  the  peasants  began 
to  seize,  in  revolutionary  style,  the  Government  stocks 
of  iron. 

Meanwhile  the  revolutionary  Government  ignored 
the  advice  and  warnings  of  the  business  community. 
The  peasants,  also,  had  no  ears  except  for  mad  incite- 
ments to  pillage  and  the  division  of  estates  amongst 
themselves.  The  spring  season  was  lost.  The  last 
trenches  held  by  the  Russians  against  starvation  were 
lost,  and  Tzar  Hunger  made  his  solemn  entry  hand  in 
hand  with  the  Bolsheviks. 

Other  industries  were  quickly  ruined  too.  The 
production  of  mineral  fuel  in  the  Donez  district  had 
diminished  in  September,  1917,  as  compared  with 
September,  1916,  as  follows: — 

Coal,  25  per  cent.;  Coke,  43  per  cent.;  Briquets, 
67  per  cent. 

The  production  of  pig-iron  in  the  same  district 
dropped  from  a  monthly  average  of  14.7  million  poods 
in  1916  to  9  million  poods  in  October,  1917.  (Torg. 
Promishlenia  Gazeta,  No.  229,  1917).  The  disorgan- 
isation of  transport  reached  enormous  dimensions. 
In  May,  1917,  on  many  of  the  principal  railways  there 
were  33  per  cent,  of  broken-down  locomotives.  The 
number  of  broken-down  railway  cars  in  1917  was 
double  that  of  1916. 

Labour  grew  very  slack  in  the  repair  shops,  and  their 
production  was  reduced  50  per  cent.  The  district 


39 


railway  committee  of  Kharkoff  issued  a  touching 
appeal  to  the  railwaymen : — 

"Citizens,  railwaymen,  employees,  stewards,  and 
workmen:  It  is  really  you  who  hold  in  your  hands  the 
fate  of  Russia.  ...  A  bleeding  country  asks  you  for 
sacrifice.  Forget  your  own  interests  as  did  our 
children  and  brothers  who  lost  their  lives  honourably 
on  the  field  of  battle.  .  .  .  Forget  your  quarrels  and 
disputes.  Begin  to  work  with  more  energy:  increase 
your  production."  (V.  Finansov,  No.  27,  1917). 
Needless  to  say,  the  appeal  was  made  to  deaf  ears. 
The  "Promishlenia  Gazeta"  (No.  230,  1917),  said:— 
"In  much  of  his  behaviour  the  ordinary  Russian  work- 
man clearly  displays  his  standard  of  political  education. 
Public  interests,  the  interests  of  the  State,  of  the 
nation,  of  the  town,  of  society,  are  strange  to  him.  He 
does  not  understand  them  and  he  does  not  want  to  hear 
of  them." 

How  rapidly  the  devastation  of  Russia's  industry 
went  on  during  the  Revolution  may  be  inferred  from 
its  condition  in  the  Petrograd  district.  The  Ministry 
of  Trade  and  Industry  made  a  census  of  the  state  of 
industry  in  this  area  soon  after  the  Revolution.  ("Torg. 
Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  87,  1917).  It  appeared 
that  production  diminished  from  January  to  April 
(1917)  in  the  following  proportions:  cotton,  17  to  29 
per  cent.;  woollens,  28.3  per  cent.;  bag  materials,  21.8 
per  cent. ;  metal  goods,  60  per  cent. ;  various  food  stuffs, 
12  to  61  per  cent.;  leather  goods,  41.9  per  cent.;  foot- 
wear, 30.4  per  cent.  The  census  showed  that  the  chief 
causes  of  reduced  production  were  (1)  reduction  of 
the  number  of  workmen,  (2)  lack  of  fuel  and  raw 
materials,  (3)  political  agitation,  (4)  the  expulsion 

40 


of  skilled  supervision,  (5)  abolition  of  piece-work,  (6) 
shortening  of  working  hours  (by  20  per  cent). 

From  these  dry  figures  of  the  official  census  we  may 
infer  the  terribly  destructive  effect  that  the  Revolution 
had  on  industry  at  the  very  beginning.  Later  on 
continual  strikes,  violence  directed  against  the  super- 
vising engineers  and  the  administration,  the  still 
further  shortening  of  working  hours  together  with 
a  lowering  of  the  quality  of  the  work — all  these  things 
delivered  blow  upon  blow  where  rather  the  most 
careful  cherishing  was  called  for.  This  mad  work  of 
a  frenzied  people  was  called  by  those  who  had  taken 
over  the  task  of  governing  the  people,  "deepening  the 
Revolution." 

According  to  information  possessed  by  the  Moscow 
Labour  Exchange  (T.  Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  224, 
1917),  wages  rose  by  over  50-0  per  cent,  during  the  war 
and  the  Revolution.  Yet  "with  closed  eyes,  exhausted 
hoarse  voice,"  Mr.  Martov  (alias  Zederbaum)  speaking 
in  the  Provisionary  Council  of  the  Russian  Republic, 
"accused  the  bourgeoisie  of  selfish  interests"  (ib.). 
Shortly  speaking,  desperate  war  was  declared  against 
Russian  industry,  not  only  by  the  enemy  and  by  the 
Blockade,  but  also  by  Russian  labour. 

The  natural  organization  of  Trade  was  also 
"flippantly"  attacked  by  the  various  Committees  of 
Public  Security  and  such  like.  Prices  were  fixed  for 
goods  qtiite  arbitrarily;  goods  were  airily  irectfuisi- 
tioned,  merchandise  seized  at  the  railway  stations, 
firms  were  forcibly  liquidated,  all  sorts  of  violence 
was  practised  against  traders,  and  the  export  of  goods 
from  one  province  to  another  was  frequently  prohi- 
bited. By  the  June  of  1917  Trade  had  ceased  in  many 

41 


parts  of  Russia,  and  panic-stricken  traders  sought 
safety  in  flight. 

A  word  more  about  the  finances  of  Russia  after  the 
Revolution.  The  total  State  Expenditure  in  the  year 

1916  was  18.000,000,000  roubles  against  a  revenue  of 
4,300,000,000  roubles  (V.  Finansov,  No.  37,  1917).  In 

1917  the  total  State  Expenditure  was  30,000,000,000 
against  5,000,000,000  of  revenue.     The  revolutionary 
Government  was  as  recklessly  lavish  as  the  old  regime 
was  prudently  economical.    Though  the  total  taxation 
was  greatly  increased  by  the  revolutionary  Govern- 
ment, the  revenue  dropped  from  580  million  roubles  in 
June,  1917,  to  307  million  roubles  in  October  of  the 
same  year.     I  remember  in  August,  1917,  how  bitterly 
the  newly-appointed  Minister  of  Finance,  Professor 
Bernazky,  spoke  when  he  told  me  that   "the  same 
workmen  who  so  loudly  demanded  the  introduction  of 
the  new  income  tax  now  refuse  to  pay  it,  and  tear  up 
the  inquiry  forms  and  beat  the  Government  inspec- 
tors." 

Into  every  economic  sphere  the  Revolution  brought 
a  demoralising  and  a  destructive  element.  The  process 
of  economic  disintegration  which  the  old  regime  fought 
so  bravely  met  with  no  obstructions  after  the  Revolu- 
tion. In  November,  1917,  Mr.  Kerensky  made  up  the 
accounts  of  the  six  months  of  Revolution  in  the 
following  terms : — 

"Russia  is  worn  out.  .  .  .  The  masses  are  worn  out 
economically.  .  .  .  The  disorganised  state  of  life  in 
general  has  had  a  psychological  effect  on  the  people." 
("Daily  Telegraph,"  Nov.  3,  1917.) 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  Kerensky  was  replaced  by  the 
Bolsheviks. 


42 


The  Economic  Disintegration  of  Russia. 
III.  During  the  Bolshevik  Rule. 

The  Kerensky  Government  was  thrown  down  by  the 
Bolsheviks  as  easily  as  the  Tzar's  Government  was 
dethroned  by  the  revolutionary  masses.  History 
repeated  itself  even  in  details.  In  March,  1917,  the 
Tzar,  Nicholas  II.,  was  abandoned  by  everybody,  his 
bodyguard  included.  In  November,  1917,  all  Russia 
turned  its  back  on  Mr.  Kerensky:  his  last  stronghold, 
the  Winter  Palace,  was  feebly  defended  only  by  the 
Women's  Battalion  and  by  a  few  officers  of  cadets. 

The  appearance  of  the  Bolsheviks  at  the  head  of 
affairs  in  Russia  was  not  the  mere  result  of  accidental 
circumstances,  nor  is  it  to  be  explained  as  the  work  of 
German  agents  and  German  money.  And  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  assume  that  the  Bolsheviks  are  a  purely 
Russian  product.  Bolshevism  is  an  international 
epidemic — like  the  "Spanish  'flu" — and  every  nation 
in  the  world  has  the  bacillus  in  its  blood.  So  long  as 
the  national  organism  is  economically  strong  and 
healthy  Bolshevism  remains  dormant,  but  as  soon  as 
that  organism  becomes  exhausted  (as  Russia  was  and 
is,  and  as  some  other  nations  are)  Bolshevism  raises 
its  head. 

By  the  masses  of  the  Russian  population — soldiers, 
labourers  and  peasants — all  the  miseries  of  the  country 
were  attributed,  not  so  much  to  the  unfavourable  strate- 
gical position  of  Russia  during  the  war  as  to  the  war 
itself.  The  desire  of  the  Russian  people  to  withdraw 
from  the  war  was  not  dictated  by  pacifism  nor  by  any 

43 


feeling  against  the  Allies.  The  desire  had  a  deeper 
root.  As  I  said  before,  the  Blockade,  in  conjunction 
with  the  natural  process  of  exhaustion  induced  by  war, 
was  strangling  Russia.  The  Allies  failed  to  liberate 
Russia  from  the  pressure  of  the  Blockade,  the  Russian 
army  failed  to  end  the  war  by  a  decisive  victory  in  the 
field,  and  the  country  had  nothing  before  it  but  to 
make  a  separate  peace  with  the  enemy.  The  movement 
for  peace — in  conditions  by  no  means  without 
precedent  in  history — was  not  so  much  the  work  of 
German  agents — though  these  had  their  part — as  of 
the  instinct  of  national  self-preservation. 

The  Bolsheviks  made  peace  with  the  enemy,  but  it 
was  not  the  peace  for  which  an  exhausted  nation  was 
longing.  It  was  a  blunder — nay,  it  was  a  forgery.  For 
the  Bolsheviks  promised  the  nation  the  peace  it  hoped 
for,  a  peace  which  should  liberate  country  from  the 
Blockade,  which  should  save  it  from  utter  economic 
collapse.  They  gave  the  conntry  a  void  peace,  empty 
of  the  blessings  of  peace. 

It  is  true  that  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  opened 
the  frontiers,  and  that  at  that  part  the  Blockade  ceased 
to  operate.  But  it  soon  appeared  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  themselves  far  too  much  exhausted — by 
war  and  Blockade — to  afford  Russia  any  economic 
assistance.  A  door  was  opened,  but  it  was  the  wrong 
door.  As  for  the  Allies — who  alone  were  able  to 
render  support — they  stopped  sending  even  those 
goods  which  they  had  hitherto  sent :  the  Blockade  was 
more  powerful  and  cruel  than  ever.  The  peace  of 
Brest-Litovsk  was  brought  at  a  great  price,  and  it 
was  worth — nothing.  It  was  worth  less  than  nothing : 
it  was  not  only  not  a  blessing,  it  was  a  curse. 

44 


The  Bolshevik  dictatorship  took  up  and  continued 
the  pernicious  work  of  the  Blockade  and  the  Revolu- 
tion. The  disintegration  increased  its  pace  till  it 
became  an  orgy  of  destruction.  That  once  mighty 
Empire  which  had  withstood  all  onslaughts  for  a 
thousand  years  was  falling  to  pieces  beneath  the 
Bolshevik  hammer  like  an  old  brick  wall. 

Let  us  not,  however,  pay  the  Bolsheviks  too  much 
honour.  They,  like  their  predecessor,  Mr.  Kerensky, 
were  servants  not  masters  of  the  Blockade;  and  it  is 
only  in  this  subordinate  capacity  that  they  can  justly 
be  recognised  as  really  talented  destroyers. 

The  dissolution  of  Russia  now  received  a  further 
powerful  impetus.  The  misery  of  the  people  was  such 
that  the  general  cry  became  "Save  what  we  can !"  The 
people  ceased  to  think  and  feel  as  citizens  of  a  great 
Empire :  each  district  came  to  regard  its  own  interests 
simply.  Great  Russia  broke  up  into  dissevered  parts, 
like  the  Ukraine,  the  Don,  the  Caucasus,  the  Volga 
districts,  and  Siberia ;  and  we  may  see  from  the  number 
of  these  "little  Russias"  that  their  frontiers  were 
determined  not  so  much  by  national  character  as  by 
economic  needs.  The  Blockade  having  ruined  that 
enormous  and  very  complicated  economic  organism, 
the  Russian  Empire,  compelled  the  people  to  return 
to  the  primitive  form  of  self -supply  ing  communities. 
.  .  .  Before  the  war  all  the  Separatists — and  the 
Bolsheviks — could  have  been  put  in  a  student's  room. 
But  -when  the  economic  soil  of  Russia  grew  sterile  of 
healthful  growth,  the  bright,  poisonous  weed  of 
Separatism  spread  like  a  dull  fire. 

The  greater  part  of  Russia  dropped  away  from 
Bolshevik  control,  but  where  the  Bolsheviks  remained 

45 


masters  they  continued  to  serve  the  Blockade:  under 
them  agriculture,  industry,  transport,  trade,  and 
finance  were  finally  destroyed. 

We  have  seen  that  by  October,  1917,  agriculture  was 
in  a  most  critical  state,  the  cultivated  area  having 
fallen  by  20  per  cent,  and  more;  by  May,  1918,  the 
shortage  of  sowing  was  increased,  in  the  northern 
provinces  to  40  per  cent,  and  in  other  provinces  from 
20  to  45  per  cent.  ("T.  Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No. 
52,  1918) .  According  to  a  statement  of  the  Bolsheviks 
themselves,  the  peasants  had  "neither  machinery  nor 
scythes  nor  reaping-hooks."  Under  these  conditions 
the  peasants  could  hardly  produce  cereals  enough  for 
themselves,  and  there  was  very  little  hope  that  they 
would  share  their  supplies  with  the  hungry  towns. 

The  Bolsheviks  were  cut  oif  from  the  bread-produc- 
ing provinces  not  only  by  severe  civil  wars  but  also 
by  the  destruction  of  railway  transport.  The  number 
of  broken-down  locomotives  on  the  Petrograd-Moscow 
railway  increased  to  47  per  cent.;  on  the  Northern 
railways  to  50  per  cent. ;  on  the  Samara-Ural,  Moscow- 
Kasan  and  Tuman  lines,  40  per  cent.;  on  the  South- 
Eastern,  Moscow-Kiev  and  Voronej  lines,  39  per  cent., 
etc.  ("T.  Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  51,  1918). 
River  and  canal  transport  was  destroyed  also ;  from  the 
opening  of  the  navigation  season  in  April  to  the  20th 
of  May,  1918,  only  33,900,000  poods  of  goods  were 
carried,  against  219,000,000  poods  for  the  same  period 
of  1917. 

The  production  of  naphtha  and  coal  greatly  dimin- 
ished. The  output  of  mineral  oil  for  the  Baku  district 
for  the  half  of  1918  was  1,878,000  tons  only — or  one- 
third  of  that  of  corresponding  period  of  the  previous 

46 


year.  The  work  of  boring  was  reduced  by  about  60 
per  cent,  as  compared  with  the  previous  year  ("Times," 
Oct.  1,  1918).  During  the  first  four  months  of  1918 
the  Donez  district  produced  less  than  200  million  poods 
of  coal — or  35  per  cent,  less  than  the  corresponding 
period  of  the  previous  year.  The  average  monthly 
output  of  one  miner  was  in  1916,  673  poods ;  in  1917, 
450  poods ;  whilst  from  the  beginning  of  1918  the  fall 
increased  in  rapidity  until,  by  April,  many  pits  had 
to  be  closed  down  altogether  (Reconstruction  Supple- 
ment, No.  9,  Vol.  II.,  1918).  According  to  a  Bolshevik 
census  of  the  Petrograd  Industrial  District  the  number 
of  workmen  diminished  by  56  per  cent,  from  the  1st 
January,  1917,  to  the  1st  of  April,  1918  ("T.  Promish- 
lenia  Gazeta,"  No.  52,  1918).  From  the  1st  of  April 
the  flow  of  workmen  from  industrial  centres  to  the 
villages  increased  greatly.  The  extreme  revolutionary 
newspaper  "Novaia  Jizn,"  in  reviewing  the  economic 
situation  at  the  end  of  the  year  1917,  says: — "The 
economic  productivity  of  the  country  has  been  deter- 
iorating progressively  from  month  to  month.  The 
monthly  output  of  coal,  for  instance,  dropped  between 
January  and  October  from  157  to  115  million  poods. 
The  output  of  pig-iron,  which  amounted  in  1916  to 
173  million  poods,  dropped  in  1917  to  130  million  poods. 
No  fewer  than  568  factories  and  works  were  shut  down 
in  the  last  six  months  of  the  year.  Since  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution  the  shutting  down  of  works  and  factories 
has  become  wholesale.  .  .  .  Speculation  in  foodstuffs 
and  even  in  money  has  attained  unheard-of  dimensions, 
and  bribery,  corruption  and  drunkenness  have  revived 
again.  ("Novaia  Jizn,"  Economic  Supplement,  March 
19,  1918,  London.) 

47 


It  is  worthy  of  remark,  and  profoundly  significant, 
that  the  self-same  forces  which  brought  the  Bolsheviks 
to  the  head  of  affairs,  mocked  their  efforts  and 
disfigured  all  their  undertakings:  even  where  these 
were  sound  in  principle  the  "powers  that  were"  dis- 
torted them  into  a  gross  and  rude  caricature.  The 
Bolshevik  "nationalisation  of  industry,"  with  all  its 
high  and  noble  aims  for  the  building  up  of  an  ideal 
state  and  community,  proved  in  practice  to  be  a  very 
ordinary  plunder,  a  common  wholesale  robbery  of  a 
few  owners  by  a  demoralised  populace.  Whilst  it  is 
true  that  the  Bolsheviks  failed  in  every  branch  of  state 
activity,  nowhere  did  their  ignorance  and  folly  so 
glaringly  appear  as  in  the  department  of  National 
Finance.  The  Bolsheviks  made  an  estimate  ("T. 
Promishlenia  Gazeta,"  No.  63,  1918)  of  state  revenue 
and  expenditure  for  the  first  six  months  of  1918.  The 
revenue  was  reckoned  as  2,852,000,000  roubles  and  the 
expenditure  as  17,602,000,000.  These  simple,  yet 
remarkable,  figures  are  sufficiently  eloquent  of  the 
nature  of  Bolshevik  Statesmanship. 

The  Blockade  threw  an  exhausted  Russia  into  the 
hands  of  the  Bolsheviks:  the  Blockade  will  drag  the 
Bolsheviks  to  the  scaffold.  The  Tzar's  Government, 
and  the  Kerensky  Government,  failed  to  liberate  the 
country  from  the  Blockade,  to  open  the  world's  market 
to  Russia,  and  to  restore  her  economic  structure.  The 
Bolsheviks  have  failed  also,  and  they  too  must  go. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  describe  in  better  or  more 
eloquent  language  than  that  of  their  friend,  Mr. 
Arthur  Ransome  (correspondent  of  "The  Daily 
News"),  the  coming  end  of  the  Bolsheviks'  rule: 

48 


"The  Soviet  revolution  is  being  slowly  and  surely 
tortured  to  death  by  starvation.  Such  happenings  as 
peasant  uprisings,  reported  from  N.  Novgorod  and 
Toula,  east  and  south  of  Moscow  and  the  armed  dis- 
persal of  an  anti-soviet  open-air  meeting  in  a  Moscow 
suburb  do  not,  however,  signify  conscious  patriotic 
revolts.  They  are  rather  the  terrific  blind  gestures  of 
a  starving  revolution  tearing  at  its  own  flesh.  Starv- 
ation in  the  towns  accentuates  the  conflict  between 
town  and  country.  .  .  .  Discontented,  blind,  groping 
and  angry,  the  nation  asks  for  food  and  peace,  but 
seeks  dimly  any  change — although  no  possible  change 
can  put  an  immediate  end  to  starvation,  or  do  more 
than  change  one  war  for  another"  ("Daily  News," 
September  10,  1918). 


The  Effect  of  the  Blockade  on  other  Belligerent 
Nations. 

The  Blockade  has  ruined  Russia,  has  disfigured  all 
its  social,  political  and  economic  life,  and  has  brought 
such  a  degree  of  humiliation  upon  Russia  that  her 
name  is  now  become  "a  by- word  of  contempt  among 
mankind"  ("Daily  Chronicle,"  September  5,  1918). 
But  not  only  has  Russia  suffered,  not  only  is  Russia 
still  suffering  from  the  Blockade ;  the  Central  Powers 
also  have  had  to  sustain  the  same  pressure;  and  even 
the  Allies  cannot  be  said  not  to  have  felt  the  pinch  of 
it  at  times. 

The  fate  of  Austria-Hungary  reminds  us  in  many 
ways  of  the  fate  of  poor  Russia.  Neither  has  ever 
had  a  strong  and  solid  economic  constitution;  both 

49 


have  had  to  suffer  considerable  invasions  of  territory. 
If  the  blockade  of  Austria-Hungary  was  not  so  power- 
ful nor  so  prolonged  as  the  blockade  of  Russia,  it  was 
still  one  of  the  most  complete  blockades  ever  effected. 
War-strain  and  blockade  together  have  ruined  the 
economic  foundations  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Em- 
pire. Like  Russia,  Austria-Hungary  suffered  first 
from  lack  of  goods,  and  later  from  lack  of  food — and 
at  last  from  starvation.  As  in  Russia,  so  here  also 
industry,  agriculture,  transport  underwent  a  progres- 
sive destruction,  with  a  consequent  serious  perturba^ 
tion  of  social  life.  The  "Neue  Freie  Presse"  described 
the  situation  as  it  was  in  August,  1918,  in  the  following 
terms  (quoted  from  "The  Times,"  August  14,  1918)  : 

"Austria  has  scarcely  a  more  dangerous  enemy  than 
high  prices.  The  disintegration  of  the  middle  classes, 
who  are  the  hardest  hit,  the  forcible  eviction  of  so 
material  an  element  as  the  bourgeoisie  from  their 
traditional  social  surroundings,  this  break-up  of  all 
that  was  best  and  strongest  in  the  State  in  time  of 
peace,  is  a  development  so  grave  that  the  purchasing 
power  of  money  ought  now  to  be  the  central  point  of 
our  whole  policy.  If  the  money  standard  should  ever 
fail,  and  if  some  day  we  should  be  able  to  throw  into 
the  balance  only  ware  for  ware,  a  crisis  would  arise, 
on  the  workings  of  which  Taine's  books  speak 
eloquently  enough,  even  for  our  time." 

Another  Vienna  newspaper,  the  "Zeit,"  gives  the 
following  picture  of  the  economic  distress  in  Austria 
as  it  was  at  the  end  of  1917  (quoted  from  "The  New 
Europe,"  September  13,  1917) : — 

"The  war  has  taught  us  modesty  in  our  methods  of 
life.  But  there  is  a  lower  limit  of  requirements,  below 

50 


which  even  the  most  modest  cannot  sink The 

war  has  put  us  upon  short  rations,  has  forced  us  to 
one  economy  after  another,  and  forced  back  our  habits 
of  life  far  behind  those  of  former  generations.  This 
took  place  more  or  less  automatically:  we  kept  on 

tightening  our  belt But,  after  all,  there  comes 

a  moment  at  last  at  which  one  cannot  go  on  cutting 
down  and  tightening  one's  belt,  because  the  primitive 
necessity  of  life  has  been  reached,  and  because  this 
can  no  longer  be  put  off.  Man  must  eat,  and  he  must 
also  clothe  himself.  He  need  not  have  sweets  or 
oysters,  or  tarts  or  cream,  he  can  give  up  roasts,  and 
even  meat;  but  bread  and  potatoes  he  simply  must 
have  to  fill  his  stomach.  In  his  dress,  too,  he  can  do 
without  all  kinds  of  superfluities,  all  that  is  mere 
fashion,  adornment  and  foppery ;  but  a  whole  coat,  an 
untorn  shirt,  and  boots  whose  soles  are  not  full  of 
holes — these  are  things  which  are  really  needed  and 
which  the  most  modest  citizen  wants  and  must  have." 

Mr.  George  A.  Shreiner,  the  representative  of  the 
Associated  Press  of  America  in  the  countries  of  the 
Central  Powers  during  the  war,  has  written  a  very 
interesting  book,  "The  Iron  Ration,"  which  is  con- 
cerned with  the  economic  and  social  effects  of  the 
Allied  Blockade  in  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  In 
this  book  there  is  a  great  deal  of  valuable  matter  about 
the  gradual  dissolution  of  economic  and  social  life 
throughout  the  countries  of  the  Central  Powers.  The 
book  may  be  compared  to  a  doctor's  bulletin,  recording 
the  progress  of  some  horrible  disease  which  reduces 
an  active  and  happy  man  to  the  similitude  of  a  spectre. 
The  author  gives  a  vivid  picture  of  how  economic 
decay  ruined  family  life  and  public  morality  in  these 

51 


countries.  In  his  preface  Mr.  Shreiner  summarises 
his  view  of  the  Central  Powers  during  wartime  in 
these  words: — 

"The  struggle  for  bread  was  the  major  aspect.  The 
words  of  the  Lord's  Prayer,  'Give  us  this  day  our  daily 
bread/  soon  came  to  have  a  great  meaning  for  the 
people  of  Central  Europe.  ...  It  will  be  noticed  that 
I  have  given  food  questions  a  great  deal  of  close  atten- 
tion. The  wartime  life  of  Central  Europe  could  not 
be  portrayed  in  any  other  manner.  All  effort  and 
thouglht  was  directed  towards  the  winning  of  the 
scantiest  fare.  Men  and  women  no  longer  strove  for 
the  pleasures  of  life,  but  for  the  absolute  essentials  of 
living.  During  the  day  all  laboured  and  scrambled  for 
food,  and  at  night  men  and  women  schemed  and  plotted 

how  to  make  the  fearful  struggle  easier So 

intense  was  that  struggle  for  bread  that  men  and 
women  began  to  look  upon  all  else  in  life  as  wholly 
secondary.  A  laxity  in  sex  matters  ensued.  .  .  . 
When  human  society  is  driven  to  realise  that  nothing 
in  life  counts  when  there  is  no  food,  intellectual 
progress  ceases.  When  bread  becomes  indeed  the 
irreducible  minimum,  the  mask  falls,  and  we  see  the 
human  being  in  all  its  nakedness." 

Somebody  has  said  that  Germany  had  a  corpse 
hanging  to  its  neck  from  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
But  this  is  only  partially  true.  Austria-Hungary  was 
not  a  "corpse"  till  after  one  or  two  years  of  war.  Then, 
indeed,  it  may  be  said  to  have  had  a  moribund  arm 
encircling  Germany's  neck,  and  to  have  stood  on  its 
legs  by  virtue  of  such  support. 

Blockade  and  war  strain  wore  out  the  State  organ- 
ism of  Austria-Hungary,  and  political  crises  became 

52 


the  ordinary  news  of  the  day.  The  Austrian  Imperial 
Government  made  every  endeavour  to  keep  the  process 
of  dissolution  within  the  bounds  of  an  established  and 
recognised  order;  but  at  last  the  revolutionary  forces 
broke  through — and  the  Austrian,  like  the  Russian 
Empire,  crumbled. 

While  it  is  true  that  many  causes  were  operative  in 
the  downfall  of  Austria  which  were  absent — or  nearly 
so — in  the  case  of  Russia:  the  riational  question  was 
very  acute  in  Austria,  but  by  no  means  so  in  Russia; 
yet  it  remains  true  that  both  Empires  fell  by  force  of 
Blockade. 

The  resemblance  of  the  two  revolutions — the  Aus- 
trian and  the  Russian — is  so  plain  that  the  man  in  the 
street  may  understand  that  the  force  which  caused  the 
collapse  of  Russia  is  playing  a  great  role  in  the  case 
of  Austria. 

We  know  that  the  chief  justification  advanced  for 
the  March  Revolution  in  Russia  was  an  accusation 
against  the  old  regime  of  "high  treason  against  the 
nation"  and  against  the  Tzar's  family  of  taking  part 
in  Rasputin's  orgies.  Similarly,  public  "opinion"  in 
Austria  accused  the  Emperor  Karl  and  his  wife  Zitta 
of  having  sold  military  secrets  to  the  enemy,  and  of 
leading  a  life  of  continual  Court  orgies.  .  .  .  The 
similarity  of  these  rumours  with  those  that  were 
circulated  in  Russia  is  of  secondary  importance ;  what 
matters  is  that  these  rumours  found  an  echo  in  the 
country  and  brought  on  the  political  crisis. 

The  reason  why  Austria-Hungary  did  not  fall  before 
she  did  was  because,  at  critical  moments,  Germany 
accorded  aid.  As  Germany  perceived  that  Austria- 
Hungary  was  suffering  beyond  her  powers  the  pressure 

53 


of  Blockade,  she  sent  her,  not  only  soldiers,  guns,  and 
munitions,  but  also  what  may  be  said  to  have  been  at 
the  time  her  last  pound  of  bread,  her  last  pair  of  boots, 
her  last  ton  of  coal.  And  owing  to  these  sacrifices 
made  by  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  was  able  to 
survive  long  after  Russia  had  gone  down. 

Even  as  I  re-write  these  lines  news  is  coming 
through  of  the  outbreak  of  revolution  in  Austria- 
Hungary.  It  would  be  unwise  to  prophesy  about  these 
events,  but  I  am  sure  at  least  of  this: — If  Austria- 
Hungary  does  not  liberate  herself  from  the  pressure 
of  Blockade,  revolution  in  that  country  will  develop 
into  Bolshevik  anarchy.  .  .  .  The  Allies  may  them- 
selves yet  save  these  national  democratic  movements 
from  degeneration  into  Bolshevik  orgies.  But  if  the 
economic  position  of  Austria-Hungary  is  not  relieved 
there  can  hardly  be  any  hope  that  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  revolution  will  escape  the  fate  of  the  Russian. 

I  shall  not.  speak  at  length  of  Germany.  The  further 
resistance  of  that  country  will  bring  it  face  to  face 
with  utter  economic  exhaustion  and  final  social  and 
political  collapse.  Even  if  the  German  Army  can 
continue  to  fight  it  is  still  doubtful  whether  the  country 
is  able  to  resist  the  further  pressure  of  the  Allies' 
blockade — which  will  assume  a  most  hard  character. 

As  regards  Italy,  in  1917,  owing  to  many  reasons, 
the  transport  of  coal  and  bread  became  disorganised. 
For  several  months  the  population  of  Italy  suffered 
from  an  insufficiency  in  the  supplies  of  bread,  fuel, 
and  other  necessities.  The  disorganisation  of  trans- 
port was  a  kind  of  blockade ;  a  blockade  in  effect  though 
not  in  fact.  The  lack  of  coal  necessitated  a  consider- 
able reduction  of  railway  traffic,  and  of  all  kinds  of 


industry — including  the  production  of  munitions.  The 
comparative  collapse  of  railway  transport  immediately 
interfered  with  the  supply  of  necessities  of  the  town 
populations  and  of  military  necessities  to  the  army. 
The  soldiers'  rations  were  greatly  reduced,  a  circum- 
stance provocative  of  much  discontent  amongst  them, 
and  the  population  of  Northern  Italy  was  brought  to 
the  verge  of  starvation.  In  short,  the  consequences 
of  this  pseudo-blockade  manifested  themselves  very 
quickly.  Hunger-riots  of  a  serious  character  broke 
out  in  the  northern  towns,  and  the  propaganda  of  the 
extreme  socialists,  hitherto  heeded  by  a  comparative 
few,  spread  rapidly  among  the  discontented  masses  of 
the  population.  This  propaganda  invaded  the  army — 
with  the  deplorable  result  of  the  defeat  at  Caporetto. 

Italy  was  saved  from  national  disaster  only  by  the 
assistance  of  the  Allies,  who  sent  her  soldiers,  guns, 
and  munitions,  and — -what  was  of  far  greater  and 
more  instant  value — bread,  coal,  meat.  This  interven- 
tion of  the  Allies  with  supplies  of  food,  fuel,  &c.,  was 
the  most  effective  sort  of  military  intervention — 
though  nobody  called  it  so.  Anyhow,  it  was  the  precise 
sort  of  intervention  that  Russia  was  longing  for,  and 
has  not  even  yet  received. 

The  United  Kindom  has  not  had  to  endure  the 
Blockade.  There  is  no  hope  for  Admiral  Tirpitz  that 
he  will  ever  be  able  to  get  his  fingers  on  the  throat 
of  England.  But  last  year,  1917,  and  at  the  beginning 
of  this,  owing  to  the  great  loss  of  tonnage,  at  least  the 
shadow  of  Blockade  rested  on  England.  There  was 
a  measure  of  disorganisation  in  the  food  supply  of 
this  country:  in  the  towns  long  queues  waited  at  the 
doors  of  the  butcher  and  the  butterman,  though  never, 

55 


happily,  at  the  baker's :  and  the  fact  is  that  discontent 
was  spreading  rapidly  throughout  the  population, 
especially  in  the  ranks  of  unskilled  labor.  Latent 
Bolshevism  began  to  stir,  to  open  drowsily  its  dull 
eyes  of  menace :  a  certain  sort  of  thrill  passed  through 
the  world  of  political  movement  from  end  to  end :  into 
certain  circles  of  English  society  fear  looked,  and 
passed,  and  left  a  memory.  .  .  .  The  more  conserva- 
tive elements  of  the  country  were  ready  to  follow  the 
lead  of  Lord  Lansdowne,  to  make  a  peace  of  compro- 
mise with  the  enemy  rather  than  risk — as  it  seemed  to 
them — political  and  social  collapse  through  the  wear 
and  tear  of  war. 

The  Government  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  correctly 
estimated  the  approaching  dangers,  and  took  all 
possible  measures  to  meet  them.  With  the  help  of 
America,  and  by  an  energetic  and  able  introduction  of 
the  system  of  rations,  the  Government  succeeded  in 
satisfactorily  solving  the  complicated  problem  of  food- 
supply  :  the  menace  of  the  Blockade  disappeared.  The 
political  and  social  results  of  the  Government's  mea- 
sures showed  itself  in  the  effective  check  administered 
to  Bolshevism  by  Labor  itself,  in  the  triumph  every- 
where at  home  of  the  Lloyd  George  Government,  and 
in  the  eloquent  silence  of  Lord  Lansdowne. 

I  have  listened  to  the  argument  that  military  defeats, 
rather  than  the  Blockade,  destroy  national  life.  But 
the  example  of  England  is  a  refutation  of  this  thesis. 
So  long  as  there  was  failure  to  control  the  submarine 
attack  the  existence  of  the  Lloyd  George  Government 
was  subject  to  moments  of  sharp  peril;  yet  the  same 
Government  never  lost  the  people's  confidence  through- 
out the  precarious  days  of  March — June,  1918,  though 


56 


the  German  Army  was  advancing  on  Paris  and  towards 
the  English  ports. 

Blockade  and  war  together  are  able  to  destroy  even 
the  strongest  and  healthiest  state;  but  Blockade  alone 
is  a  very  dangerous  enemy  to  any  nation.  Spain, 
Holland,  Sweden  Switzerland  and  other  neutral  coun- 
tries suffer  greatly  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  getting 
necessary  supplies  from  abroad.  These  countries  are 
not  "officially"  subject  to  Blockade,  but,  in  reality,  they 
experience  an  effective  pressure  from  it,  though  in  a 
mild  form.  In  all  these  countries  we  see  the  develop- 
ment of  strong  revolutionary  movements,  of  hunger- 
riots,  and  an  alarming  progress  of  Bolshevism;  we 
see  the  fall  of  state  authority  and  the  coming  of 
general  political  and  social  disintegration. 


Blockade  and,  other  Factors  of  National  Disintegration. 

At  the  present  time  it  is  difficult,  from  lack  of  mate- 
rial, to  achieve  any  satisfactory  analysis  of  the 
economical  social  and  political  collapse  of  Russia. 
Therefore,  at  present,  one  must  be  satisfied  with  mark- 
ing only  the  outlines  of  the  process  which  has 
undermined  the  strength  of  Russia  and  has  caused  her 
downfall. 

It  is  possible,  however,  even  with  the  general 
information  we  already  possess,  to  picture  to  our- 
selves the  terrible  extent  of  the  havoc  the  war  has 
made  in  Russian  economic  life.  It  is  not  necessary  to  be 
an  expert  in  economic  matters  to  understand  that  no 
nation  in  the  world  can  continue  to  exist  when  nearly 
40  per  cent,  of  its  able  workmen  are  taken  away  from 

57 


the  production  of  goods  whilst  the  thus  depopulated 
national  industry  is  at  the  same  time  called  upon  to 
yield  up  one  half  its  production  to  the  army. 

Russia,  after  the  mobilisation  of  industry  for  war 
-dn  1915,  was  in  the  tragic  position  of  having  to  supply 
the  needs  of  150  millions  of  population  on  a  production 
which  was  one  quarter  of  the  standard  production  in 
peace  time,  and  to  suffer  the  entire  cessation  of  the 
influx  of  goods  from  abroad. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Russia  fell :  it  is  surprising 
— and  the  world  will  acknowledge  it  when  all  the  facts 
of  Russia's  privations  shall  be  made  known — it  is  sur- 
prising that  she  should  have  stood  so  long. 

The  Blockade  was  the  chief  cause  of  all  the  disasters 
in  Russia ;  but  I  am  far  from  asserting  that  the  Block- 
ade was  the  only  cause.  The  present  war  has  taken  on 
such  an  exhausting  character  that  even  under  the  most 
favourable  conditions  one  or  another  nation  must  have 
had  to  drop  out  from  utter  exhaustion.  There  is  no 
nation  in  the  world  which  could  bear  for  an  indefinitely 
prolonged  period  the  strain  that  such  a  war  imposes. 
Under  any  given  economic,  social  and  political  condi- 
tions any  nation  can  hold  out  but  for  a  limited  time. 
It  is  true  that  the  present  war  has,  in  a  sense,  dissolved 
national  frontiers  among  the  Allied  nations,  but  even 
so  the  position  is  still  only  that  the  degree  of  resistance 
which  any  one  country  is  capable  of  is  largely  determ- 
ined by  the  degree  of  resistance  of  which  its  partners 
are  severally  capable.  The  power  of  resistance  of 
Italy  is  determined  by  the  power  of  resistance  of 
France,  Great  Britain  and  America.  The  power  of 
resistance  of  Turkey  is  dependent  on  the  resources  of 

58 


Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Completely  block- 
aded nations,  isolated  from  their  Allies,  are,  of  course, 
limited  in  their  power  of  resistance  by  their  internal 
resources  strictly — which  was  the  case  with  Russia. 

The  isolation  of  an  enemy  by  Blockade  is,  then,  the 
most  powerful  of  all  factors  in  this  war.  Other 
weapons  destroy  armed  forces,  but  the  Blockade 
delivers  blow  upon  blow,  now  here,  now  there,  till 
every  bone  in  the  national  body  is  broken.  Such  a 
nation  may  not  bleed  visibly ;  it  simply  collapses.  .  .  . 
It  is  remarkable,  by  the  way,  how  little  attention  has 
been  paid  in  the  past  to  the  Blockade  as  a  decisive 
weapon  of  war.  Many  histories  of  wars  would  need 
to  be  entirely  rewritten  if  the  influence  of  the  Blockade 
in  the  affairs  of  war  as  well  as  in  "the  history  of  the 
world"  were  to  be  given  its  true  place.  People  speak 
at  great  length  of  the  influence  of  sea-power  in  the 
war;  but  what  is  that  but  the  use  of  effective  means 
to  establish  Blockade  or  to  fend  it  off? 

Naturally,  the  measure  of  the  effect  of  the  Blockade 
is  determined  by  circumstances  like  the  political  organ- 
isation of  the  country,  its  social  constitution,  economic 
resources,  public  discipline,  the  policies  of  political 
parties,  the  quality  and  temper  of  its  statecraft  and 
of  its  statesmen — and  so  forth.  Take  Great  Britain: 
her  degree  of  endurance  of,  and  resistance  to  the 
exhaustion  of  war  was  far  less  under  Mr.  Asquith's 
Government  than  under  that  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  .  . 
If  it  had  been  possible  for  Russia,  from  the  very 
beginning,  to  have  had  a  better  government  than  the 
old  Imperial  Government,  it  is  probable  that  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  country  would  not  have  come  on  so 
rapidly  nor  the  effect  of  the  Blockade  have  been  so 

59 


disastrous.  And  again,  if  the  new  revolutionary 
Government  had  used  the  national  enthusiasm  to  better 
purposes  than  mad  socialistic  experiments,  and  had 
firmly  suppressed  the  pernicious  propaganda  that  was 
spreading  through  the  country  and  the  army,  Russia 
might  then  perhaps  have  prolonged  her  integral  exist- 
ence for  a  year  or  more.  But  in  any  case,  Russia's 
time  was  bound  to  be  short;  much  shorter  than  that 
of  any  other  belligerent  nation.  Looking  at  a  map 
of  Russia,  we  may  permit  ourselves  to  perceive  a 
certain  fanciful  resemblance  of  the  configuration  of 
the  Baltic  Sea  to  a  woman  on  her  knees.  Let  us  accept 
the  figure :  see  how  it  fits  the  case.  The  Baltic  stretches 
out  her  arms  to  Russia  with  the  gifts,  if  not  of  the 
world,  certainly  of  Europe.  But  the  Blockade  paral- 
ysed these  bounteous  arms,  and  during  the  whole 
period  of  war  the  Baltic  could  give  Russia  not  a  single 
pound  of  bread,  not  a  ton  of  coal  or  iron,  not  so  much 
as  a  pair  of  boots.  .  .  .  The  Black  Sea  was  closed  too. 
Russia  began  the  war  with  a  millstone  about  her  neck. 
The  enemy  saw  to  it  that  she  was  not  loosed :  the  noose 
grew  tighter,  and  the  weight  dragged  more  cruelly; 
and  the  more  this  old  strong  nation  struggled  the  more 
she  might,  for  her  struggles  only  served  to  hasten  the 
end. 


How  to  save  Russia. 

Russia  has  fallen  beneath  the  blows  of  the  Blockade, 
and  so  long  as  the  Blockade  continues  it  is  useless  to 
expect  that  the  country  will  be  restored  to  the  normal 
conditions  of  life.  So  long  as  Russia  is  left  at  the 


60 


mercy  of  the  Blockade  all  the  noble  efforts  of  Russian 
patriots  and  of  the  Allies  to  save  the  nation  from  the 
red  terror  of  anarchy  will  be  useless — sacrifices  made 
in  vain.  Any  internal  rising  of  patriots  against  the 
Bolsheviks  is  doomed  to  failure;  the  intervention  of 
the  Allies  at  Murman,  Archangel  or  Vladivostok  are 
palliatives  only;  all  warm  words  of  sympathy  are  void 
and  meaningless  so  long  as  Russia  is  not  freed  from 
the  Blockade. 

At  last  (November,  1918),  after  a  long  delay,  the 
Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  are  open  to  the  Allied 
Fleets ;  and  Southern  Russia  is  open  to  the  world  again 
— a  most  momentous  event  for  Russia.  At  last  an 
opportunity  is  come  to  help  Russia  and  to  save  her 
people.  It  is  Russia's  Day. 

Every  Russian  man  with  religious  feeling  will  cross 
himself  on  hearing  of  this  event.  Every  Russian 
patriot  will  rejoice  and  say,  "Now  we  have  a  chance 
to  restore  our  Fatherland!" 

The  Blockade  is  raised;  yet,  by  a  paradox,  the 
Blockade  still  rests  heavily  upon  Russia.  For  the 
country  has  no  money  wherewith  to  buy  goods,  has 
no  wares  to  exchange  for  wares,  has  no  ships  to  bring 
cargoes  to  her  starving  populations.  Four  years  of 
Blockade.  Think  what  it  means.  Let  any  man 
picture  to  himself  what  would  be  left  of  his  own  coun- 
try after  four  years  of  Blockade.  If  the  Allies  had 
raised  the  Blockade  just  one  year  earlier  Russia  would 
have  begun  quickly  to  recover,  would  not  need  to  ask 
the  Allies  for  sacrifices.  As  it  is  Russia  lies  prone, 
and  cannot  rise  without  the  Allies  help  her. 

As  soon  as  communication  is  restored  with  the  Black 
Sea  ports  of  Russia  it  will  be  necessary  to  send  there 

61 


all  kinds  of  goods.  When  the  most  vital  needs  of  the 
country  are  satisfied  the  Allies  should  send  support 
for  the  task  of  restoring  industry,  transport,  the 
money  system,  &c.  Give  the  Russian  people  some  sort 
of  sufficiency  of  food  and  of  clothing,  and  so  you  will 
bestow  upon  them  a  little  leisure  to  think  of  something 
else  than  cold  and  hunger.  With  minds  not  so  pre- 
occupied they  will  hearken  to  you,  and  talk  with  you, 
and  confide  in  you  precisely  how  much  they  like  Bolshe- 
viks and  Germans.  But  do  not,  I  pray  you,  send 
political  men  to  Russia,  nor  agitators  from  America, 
nor  demagogues  from  the  East  End  of  London.  Rather 
despatch  there  all  the  engineers  you  can  spare  (re- 
member! I  have  already  mentioned  sacrifices), 
skilled  workmen  and  commercial  men  of  experience  to 
assist  Russia  in  the  task  of  reconstructing  her  eco- 
nomic life. 

No  eloquent  proclamations  to  the  peoples  of  Russia 
can  take  the  place  of  measures  immediately  instituted 
for  the  restoration  of  economic  life  in  Russia.  At  the 
present  time  the  most  eloquent  speech  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  of  President  Wilson,  or  of  M.  Clemenceau,  is 
worth  less  for  Russia  than  a  pound  of  bread,  a  pair  of 
boots,  or  a  suit  of  second-hand  clothes — except  in  so 
far  as  they  tend  to  bring  these  necessaries  to  Russia. 


CONCLUSION. 

If  this  little  work  serves  to  further  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  chief  cause  of  Russia's  collapse  I  shall 
be  fully  recompensed  for  the  trouble  of  writing  it; 

62 


and  if  it  should  help  towards  the  formation  of  new 
ideas  as  to  the  nature  of  the  great  social  upheavals  and 
dislocations  produced  by  the  war,  it  will  have  done 
more  than  I  dare  to  hope.  But  I  should  like,  as  a 
Russian,  as  it  were  to  underline  the  warning  that  the 
Russian  collapse  into  anarchy  proffers  to  the  whole 
world.  The  Allies  have  fought  with  great  success 
against  the  German  Military  Power,  against  the 
dictatorship  of  the  German  Mailed  Fist.  But  the 
exhaustion  of  war  has  greatly  weakened  State  power 
and  has  loosened  the  social  structure  of  nations.  These 
conditions  offer  a  great  temptation  to  leaders  of  labor 
to  utilise  them  to  the  end  of  establishing  another 
dictatorship — the  dictatorship  of  a  proletariat.  In 
my  opinion  it  should  be  made  clear  that  any  attempt  to 
introduce  Socialism  by  force  will  be  met  mercilessly  by 
the  forces  that  would  still  stand  for  orderly  evolution ; 
for  the  world  is  weary  of  the  dictatorship  of  Hohen- 
zollerns  and  Bolsheviks  alike,  and  has  tasted  the  fruits 

thereof There    is    no    firm    barrier    between 

Socialism  and  Bolshevism.  Bolshevism  is  simply  a 
more  militant  form  of  Socialism.  Bolsheviks  are  a  new 
military  caste  of  Socialists.  Bolsheviks  threaten  anew 
the  peace  of  the  nations.  Great  as  are  the  sacrifices 
that  the  children  of  men  have  been  called  upon  to  make 
?ince  August,  1914,  they  are  slight  compared  with 
those  that  the  altars  and  the  priesthood  of  internecine 
strife  would  require  of  us.  This  war  has  scourged  us 
with  whips;  but  that  war  would  scourge  us  with 
scorpions. 


63 


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